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Survey period occurred through judicial decisions.
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
On rehearing in Smith v. Clary Corp.,' the Texas Supreme Court reaf-

firmed its prior holding that the aggregating statute, 2 which allows multiple plaintiffs to aggregate their claims for purposes of the minimum
jurisdictional amount in district court, 3 will not defeat the subject matter
jurisdiction of a county court at law over counterclaims brought by multiple defendants that exceed, in the aggregate, the maximum jurisdictional
limit of that court. 4 In doing so, the court assumed, without deciding, that
the aggregating statute would even be applicable to county courts at law. 5
The court's initial opinion, in contrast, expressly concluded that the statute applies only in the district courts. 6
In Chenault v. Phillips,7 the supreme court held that the district court
was the proper forum for several attorneys' constitutional challenge to
the Attorney Occupation Tax 8 and, therefore, refused to grant the attorneys leave to file an original petition for writ of mandamus in the high
court. 9 The court distinguished State Bar of Texas v. Gomez,' 0 in which it

had held that its own supervisory authority over attorneys practicing in
Texas precluded the district court's jurisdiction over a suit to require attorneys to provide mandatory pro bono services," on the basis that the
plaintiffs in Gomez sought to have the district court usurp the supreme
court's "administrativepowers, not jurisdictionalpowers," whereas the at-

torneys in Chenault were levelling a constitutional challenge to a statute
that affects them.' 2
Flores v. Peschel'3 presented the question of how far a district court
may go to protect its dominant jurisdiction over a matter that is also the
subject of another, later-filed action pending in a different county. The
court of appeals noted that the usual procedure in such a circumstance is
to file a plea in abatement in the second-filed action or, in some "rare
circumstances," to seek an injunction from the court with dominant juris1. 917 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1996).
2. TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 24.009 (Vernon 1988).
3. Smith, 917 S.W.2d at 797.
4. Smith v. Clary Corp., 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1026, 1027 (July 7, 1995), opinion superseded and rehearingoverruled, 917 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1996) (discussed in A. Erin Dwyer et
al., Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law 49 SMU L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 Annual Survey]).
5. Smith, 917 S.W.2d at 798.
6. Smith, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1027.
7. 914 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
8. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 191.141-.145 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997).
9. Chenault, 914 S.W.2d at 141-42.
10. 891 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1994).
11. Id. at 244-45.
12. Chenault, 914 S.W.2d at 142 (emphasis original).
13. 927 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding).
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diction to prevent the parties from proceeding in the other case. 14 In
Flores, however, the dominant jurisdiction court ordered that the second
action be transferred to it from the court in another county. 15 The court
of appeals held that such a transfer order was the equivalent of an injunction prohibiting the second court from proceeding, and the dominant ju16
risdiction court therefore lacked authority to enter such an order.
II.

SERVICE OF PROCESS

17
A failure to strictly comply with all of the requirements of Rule 109a
governing substituted service resulted in the reversal of a default judgment in Isaac v. Westheimer Colony Ass'n. 18 The plaintiff in that case was
unsuccessful in attempting to serve the defendant at the residence address listed on his driver's license. Moreover, although the person who
answered the door claimed to be the defendant's father, he refused to
confirm the defendant's whereabouts. Unable to confirm a home or business address for the defendant, plaintiff was unable to move for the substituted service permitted under Rule 106(b) 19 and instead sought
permission for substituted service under Rule 109a. 20 The court found
that plaintiff had exercised due diligence in attempting service and authorized service by leaving the petition with anyone over sixteen at defendant's last known address. 21 However, Plaintiff did not ask for, and
the trial court did not appoint, an attorney ad litem, as required by Rule
109a, to represent the defendant when he did not appear. 22 Therefore,
23
the court of appeals reversed plaintiff's default judgment.
Practitioners often face the dilemma of how to serve a non-appearing
defendant with papers filed subsequent to the original petition. In re
R.D.C.24 provides guidance on this issue. In R.D.C., the plaintiff
amended her petition and served the non-appearing defendant with a
copy by certified mail.2 5 The court of appeals acknowledged the general
rule that a non-appearing defendant is entitled to service of a new "cita-

14. Id. at 212.
15. Id. at 211.
16. Id. at 212-13.
17. TEX. R. Civ. P. 109a.
18. 933 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
19. TEx. R. Civ. P. 106(b) (court may on motion authorize service by leaving copy of
citation and petition with anyone over sixteen years of age at defendant's usual place of
business or usual place of abode or other place where he can probably be found).
20. TEx. R. Civ. P. 109a (authorizing court on motion to prescribe different method of
substituted service of process when service by publication would be authorized). Isaac, 933
S.W.2d at 589-90.
21. Isaac, 933 S.W.2d at 591. See also G.F.S. Ventures, Inc. v. Harris, 934 S.W.2d 813
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ requested) (finding sufficient diligence in ser-

vice to authorize substituted service on Secretary of State where corporation's registered
agent was no longer at address given and current resident did not know agent's
whereabouts).

22.
23.
24.
25.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 109a; Isaac, 933 S.W.2d at 590.
Isaac, 933 S.W.2d at 591.
912 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ).
Id. at 855.
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tion" when an amended petition alleges a new claim or seeks a more
onerous judgment, but noted that no cases discussed the impact of Rule
27
21a 26 allowing service of papers other than the original citation by mail.
Concluding that Rule 21a expressly and unambiguously permitted what
plaintiff had done, and finding no express requirement in the Rules for
issuance and service of a new citation, the court held that a plaintiff can
serve an amended petition on a non-appearing defendant by mail regardless of whether it adds a cause of action or seeks a more onerous judgment.2 8 Because Rule 106(a)(2) 29 authorizes service of the citation and
petition by certified mail, return receipt requested, the cautious practitioner should still consider, notwithstanding the decision in R.D.C., having a new citation issued and having an authorized private process server
mail the citation and amended petition to the non-appearing defendant.
Potential pitfalls in service of process extend even to the filing of the
return of citation. In Verlander Enterprises,Inc. v. Graham,30 the plaintiff
filed an amended return as permitted by Rule 11831 to correct an error on
the original return. 32 The court of appeals reversed plaintiffs default
judgment because the corrected return was not endorsed on or attached
to the original citation or another validly issued citation, which the court
held was required. 33 Plaintiff State of Texas fared better in Regalado v.
State,34 where its return of a citation directed to "Maria Regalado, d/b/a
Fred Regalado Bail Bonds" reflected that service was delivered to
"'Name: c/o Maria Regalado.' ''3 5 Noting that strict compliance with the
service rules "does not require 'obeisance to the minutest detail,"' 36 the
court held that the fair and reasonable interpretation of the return was
37
that the citation was personally served on Maria Regalado.
III.

SPECIAL APPEARANCE

In CSR Ltd. v. Link,38 the Texas Supreme Court once again allowed a
defendant to obtain immediate appellate review of the denial of its special appearance under Rule 120a.39 Relying on the exception it first articulated in CanadianHelicopters Ltd. v. Wittig4 that an ordinary appeal
26. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a.
27. Id.; R.D.C., 912 S.W.2d at 855.
28. R.D.C., 912 S.W.2d at 856.
29. TEX. R. Ov.P. 106(a)(2); accordP & H Transp., Inc. v. Robinson, 930 S.W.2d 857,
859 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ requested).
30. 932 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, n.w.h.).
31. TEX. R. Civ. P. 118.
32. Graham, 932 S.W.2d at 260.
33. Id. at 262.
34. 934 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, n.w.h.).
35. Id. at 854.
36. Id. (quoting Herbert v. Greater Gulf Coast Enter., 915 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
37. Id.
38. 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
39. TEX. R. Ov.P. 120a; CSR, Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 597.
40. 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
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is an adequate remedy for the erroneous denial of special appearance, 41
the court held that the defendant in this asbestos case had demonstrated
the type of "extraordinary circumstances" that justified mandamus relief. 42 The court reasoned that the burdens of mass tort litigation on the
resources of the defendant, which could potentially be exposed to numerous lawsuits, create a great incentive to settle regardless of the merits and
therefore supported the conclusion that an appellate remedy was inadequate. 43 The court also considered the efficient use of the state's limited
judicial resources, a significant percentage of which are devoted to asbes44
tos litigation, as a factor favoring a right to mandamus relief.
Both the concurring45 and dissenting6 opinions in CSR Ltd. complained that the supreme court's recent decisions in this area provide little guidance for practitioners regarding what other types of situations will
be deemed to present sufficiently extraordinary circumstances to justify
mandamus relief. 47 Their proposed solutions, however, differ. Justice
Gonzalez would overrule Walker v. Packer48 and its progeny "to the extent they hold that a foreign defendant with no ties to Texas must make a
separate showing of harm before mandamus will issue to correct an order
denying a special appearance. '49 Justice Baker, on the other hand, would
relegate the defendant to the ordinary appellate process except in cases
involving sovereign immunity, comity, or the parent-child relationship.5 0
IV. VENUE
Numerous cases decided during the Survey period involved the question of whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of a venue hearing to permit one of the parties to conduct discovery.
This issue arose in City of LaGrange v. McBee 5l in the context of a motion to transfer pursuant to Rule 257.52 A hearing on McBee's motion to
transfer venue was scheduled only ten days after the motion was filed.
The City responded with a motion for continuance seeking additional
time to obtain and file controverting affidavits on the issue of local prejudice. At the subsequent hearing, the trial court denied both the motion
for continuance and McBee's motion to transfer. Instead, the court took
judicial notice of the alleged local bias and granted the change of venue
41. Id. at 307.
42. CSR, Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 596.
43. Id. at 596.
44. Id. at 596-97.
45. Id. at 597 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 599 (Baker, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 598, 601.
48. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
49. CSR, Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 598-99 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 599, 601 (Baker, J., dissenting).
51. 923 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
52. TEx. R. Civ. P. 257(c) permits a change of venue upon motion of either party
where an "impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is pending."
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on its own motion. 53 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial
54
court abused its discretion by denying the City reasonable discovery.
Rule 258 expressly permits the parties to conduct reasonable discovery in
support of, or in opposition to, a motion to transfer venue on the basis of
local prejudice. 55 By refusing to continue the hearing, the trial court de56
nied the City reasonable discovery.
Beard v. Gonzalez57 involved facts analogous to those in McBee. A
hearing on plaintiff's motion to transfer venue under Rule 257 was scheduled a mere twenty-one days after the motion was filed. Although defendant moved for a continuance, the trial court denied that motion and
transferred the case on the basis of the affidavit and deposition evidence
filed by the plaintiff. Like the McBee court, the court of appeals in Beard
also held that the trial judge abused its discretion in denying the requested continuance.5 8 The Beard decision went one step further, however, holding that mandamus was appropriate because the trial court's
order conflicted with Rule 87, 5 9 which requires at least forty-five days
60
notice of the hearing.
In Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals,6 1 the
Texas Supreme Court addressed similar circumstances in the context of a
garden-variety motion to transfer venue that did not involve issues of local prejudice under Rule 257. A hearing on the defendant's motion to
transfer venue was scheduled with more than forty-five days notice. At
this hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for continuance and
reset the hearing twenty-four days later in order to allow additional discovery. When the second hearing date arrived, the plaintiffs again moved
for a continuance, alleging that the defendant had failed to respond appropriately to the discovery they had initiated during the interim. The
trial court denied this second motion for continuance and ordered the
case transferred. Like the courts in the two cases discussed above, the
court of appeals concluded that the trial court's actions deprived the
53. McBee, 923 S.W.2d at 90 n.1. The court of appeals in McBee noted that a trial
court has no authority to change venue in a civil suit on its own motion. Id. (citing Robertson v. Gregory, 663 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, orig. proceeding);
Humphrey v. Rawlins, 88 S.W.2d 776, 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, orig. proceeding)). Nevertheless, it did not' reach the issue whether the order of transfer was void on
this basis alone. Id.
54. McBee, 923 S.W.2d at 91 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792,
793 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus available to correct abuse of discretion in
failing to afford party seeking transfer under Rule 258 a reasonable opportunity before
hearing to supplement the record with affidavits and discovery products)).
55. TEX. R. Civ. P. 258.
56. McBee, 923 S.W.2d at 91.
57. 924 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
58. Id. at 765.
59. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(1).
60. Beard, 924 S.W.2d at 765 (citing Henderson v. O'Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905, 905 (Tex.
1990) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus available when trial court fails to follow procedural
requirements of TEX. R. Civ. P. 87 concerning party's right to sufficient notice of the venue
hearing)).
61. 929 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1996).
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plaintiffs of their opportunity for reasonable discovery on the venue issue.6 2 Accordingly, it held the plaintiffs lacked
an adequate remedy by
63
appeal, thus entitling them to mandamus.
The supreme court disagreed and conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the court of appeals to withdraw its mandamus judgment. 64 In reaching this decision, the court contrasted its earlier holding
in Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye,65 a case which, like McBee and Beard,
involved a motion to transfer venue under Rule 257.66 Rule 258 provides
that "reasonable discovery" in support of a Rule 257 venue motion "shall
be permitted. ' 67 No parallel provision, however, exists with respect to
venue motions under Rule 87.68 Moreover, the court observed that there
were no extraordinary circumstances in the case akin to those in Union
Carbide;the venue hearing was set five months after the lawsuit was filed,
the plaintiffs had not undertaken any discovery until the date their response to the venue motion was due, and the trial court gave them one
continuance of the venue hearing. 69 In conclusion, the court reiterated
70
that venue determinations generally are not reviewable by mandamus,
and noted that to make an exception whenever a trial court limits a
'71
party's opportunity for reasonable discovery would "swallow the rule."
A peculiar turn of events led to the decision in Orion Enterprises,Inc.
v. Pope.72 The defendants' motions to transfer venue were originally set
for hearing by the court in November. By agreement of all parties, the
hearing was first reset to January 8 and later to January 29. By that time,
the case had been transferred for purely administrative reasons to another court. Consequently, when the district clerk sent a notice to the
parties confirming the second resetting to January 29, she also confirmed
that the venue motions would be heard by the new court. At the hearing
on January 29, however, the newly-assigned judge announced, to everyone's surprise, that the original judge had denied the venue motions by a
written order dated January 8, apparently because the motions had never
been removed from his docket despite the agreed, second resetting. The
defendants immediately moved for reconsideration, but by the date of the
62. Woods v. Alvarez, 925 S.W.2d 119, 122-23 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), writ of
mandamus conditionally granted sub nom, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Thirteenth Court
of Appeals, 929 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
63. Id. at 123.
64. Bridgestone/Firestone,929 S.W.2d at 442.
65. 798 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1990).
66. Bridgestone/Firestone,929 S.W.2d at 441-42.
67. Id. at 441. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 258.
68. Bridgestone/Firestone,929 S.W.2d at 442. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 87 with TEX.
R. Civ. P. 257, 258.
69. Bridgestone/Firestone,929 S.W.2d at 442.
70. Id. One case decided during the Survey period, KJ Eastwood Inv., Inc. v. Enlow,
923 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, orig. proceeding), correctly identifies at least
one exception to this general rule, which was recently enacted by statute. Pursuant to TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642 (Vernon Supp. 1996), mandamus is available to
enforce a mandatory venue provision. Id. at 258.
71. Bridgestone/Firestone,929 S.W.2d at 442.
72. 927 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding).
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hearing on that motion, more than thirty days had expired since entry of
the written order denying the venue motions. On that basis, the judge
reluctantly denied the motion to reconsider.
The court of appeals, however, conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to reconsider the first judge's order denying
the motions to transfer venue. 73 Although the appellate court disagreed
with defendants' argument that their venue motions were not 7actually
4
"heard" because there was never an oral hearing on January

8,

it still

concluded that they did not receive the notice required by Rule 8775 inasmuch as no one had notice the motions would be decided by the originally-assigned judge on January 8.76 Analogizing to cases decided in the
summary judgment context, 77 the court acknowledged that "reasonable"
notice of the resetting is probably sufficient when the rule-required period of notice was given of the initial hearing date. 78 But this relaxation
of the notice rule does not permit the trial court to decide the motion
without any notice or hearing after the initial hearing date is passed by
agreement. 79 The court also held that the newly-assigned judge had jurisdiction to reconsider the order denying the venue motions notwithstanding the passage of thirty days.80 Unlike an order granting a motion to
transfer venue,81 the order denying the venue motions was interlocutory
both with respect to the parties and with respect to the trial court until a
final judgment had been rendered in the case.82
Three other cases deciding miscellaneous venue issues are worthy of
note. In Wichita County, Texas v. Hart,8 3 the Texas Supreme Court held
73. Id. at 661.
74. Id. at 657. According to the court, "[n]othing in Rule 87 indicates that an oral
hearing is required on a motion to transfer venue" and the rule "appears to contemplate
the possibility of a hearing by written submission." Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(b) (court
shall determine motion on basis of pleadings, stipulations and such affidavits and attachments as may be filed); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986).
See also Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. NASA 1 Business Ctr., 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988)
(term "hearing" does not necessarily contemplate either an appearance before court or
oral presentation). Because of the other bases for its decision, the court decided it need
not actually decide whether Rule 87 always requires an oral hearing on a motion to transfer. Orion, 927 S.W.2d at 658.
75. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(1) provides that "[ejxcept on leave of court each party is entitled to at least 45 days notice of a hearing on the motion to transfer."
76. Orion, 927 S.W.2d at 658.
77. See, e.g., Birdwell v. Texins Credit Union, 843 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Int'l Ins. Co. v. Herman G. West, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
78. Orion, 927 S.W.2d at 658.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 659.
81. When a trial court grants a motion to transfer venue, the order is interlocutory as
to the parties but final as to the transferring court; accordingly, the transferring court's
plenary power over its order expires thirty days after it is signed. HCA Health Servs. of
Texas, Inc. v. Salinas, 838 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. 1992).
82. Orion, 927 S.W.2d at 659.
83. 917 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1996).
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that the Whistleblower Act's venue provision8 4 is merely permissive and
does not override the mandatory provision for suits against counties contained in the venue statute.8 5 In Glover v. Moser,86 the court of appeals
concluded that a trial court must hear and determine a motion to transfer
venue prior to hearing a motion for default judgment, even though the
defendant never has filed an answer, 87 so long as the defendant has properly filed his motion and obtained a hearing thereon.8 8 Finally, in GeoChem Tech Corp. v. Verseckes,8 9 the court decided an issue expressly left
open by the supreme court in Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc.,90 holding that venue
is fixed in the county to which transfer is sought whenever a plaintiff voluntarily nonsuits his case while a motion to transfer is pending.9 1 Numerous decisions under the pre-existing venue statute and rules had held that
venue was fixed in the county named in a plea of privilege 92 whenever a
plaintiff nonsuited his action before the trial court made its venue determination. 93 Although it has been generally thought that this "venue-fixing" rule survived the 1983 venue amendments 94 despite the Ruiz court's
refusal to address the issue, the decision in GeoChem appears to be the
84. TEX. GOV'T CODE AN. § 554.007(a) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1997) ("A public employee of a state governmental entity may sue under this chapter in a district court of the
county in which the cause of action arises or in a district court of Travis County.").
85. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.015 (Vernon 1986) ("An action against
a county shall be brought in that county."); Hart, 917 S.W.2d at 782.
86. 930 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, n.w.h.).
87. Id at 944. The court observed that, while an answer may be filed concurrently
with or after the motion to transfer venue without risking waiver, neither the rules nor the
case law require the filing of an answer prior to the trial court's determination on the
motion to transfer venue. Id. at 943-44. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(1); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN.

§ 15.063 (Vernon 1986).

88. Glover, 930 S.W.2d at 944. The court thereby distinguished the situation presented
in Duplantis v. Noble Toyota, Inc., 720 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ),
where the defendant, who filed a motion to transfer venue but no answer, never attempted
to obtain a hearing on its motion and thereby failed to comply with TEX. R. Civ. P. 87.
Glover, 930 S.W.2d at 944.
89. 929 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, writ requested).
90. 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993).
91. GeoChem, 929 S.W.2d at 89-90. According to the court, the plaintiff in these circumstances waives not only the right to contest the merits of the motion but also the right
to require proof under TEX. R. Civ. P. 87 that venue is proper in the county to which
transfer is sought. Id.
92. Prior to the amendment in 1983, the rules of procedure governing venue hearings
provided for the filing of a "plea of privilege" as the procedural mechanism for challenging
a plaintiff's choice of venue. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 120a, 385, 527 (1983).
Complementing the legislature's 1983 overhaul of the Texas venue statute, Act of June 17,
1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2119-24 [now codified at TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001-.100 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1997)], the Texas
Supreme Court promulgated amended procedural rules in 1983 that eliminated all references to the plea of privilege. See Order of June 15, 1983, reprinted in 46 Tex. B.J. 858-59
(1983).
93. See, e.g., Royal Petroleum Corp. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543, 135 S.W.2d 958, 967
(1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 601 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
94. See Conoco, Inc. v. Ruiz, 818 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991),
affd., 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993); Hendrick Medical Ctr. v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, no writ), discussed in Ernest E. Figari, Jr. et al., Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 491, 501-02 (1986).
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first to squarely decide the matter.95

V. PARTIES
Questions about interlocutory appeals from class certification orders
continue to plague Texas courts. Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which authorizes the taking of interlocutory ap-

peals in limited instances, allows a party to appeal from an interlocutory
order that "certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under
Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. '96 Several years ago, the
court in Pierce Mortuary Colleges, Inc. v. Bjerke97 held that section 51.014
authorized an interlocutory appeal only with respect to the original order
certifying the class and not a later amendment of that order. 98 For this
reason, the court of appeals in St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Voluntary PurchasingGroups, Inc.99 held that it had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of a class certification order entered less than thirty
minutes after plaintiffs filed their original petition. The defendants ar-

gued that the order's language suggested that some other ruling may
eventually be made about the propriety of proceeding as a class and the

order therefore lacked finality. 100 The court observed, however, that

Pierce requires a party to appeal from the first version of the order, and a
later amended order expanding the class might not be appealable. 1 1
Having decided this jurisdictional issue, the court then reversed the trial

court's order because it was entered without a hearing' 0 2 and "no notice
of the proposed mandatory class certification was given to admittedly
known parties already engaged in sixteen other lawsuits" against the
03
defendants.'
Also relying on Pierce, the court of appeals in De Los Santos v. Occidental Chemical Corp.'0 4 refused to entertain an interlocutory appeal of
95. GeoChem, 929 S.W.2d at 89-90.
96. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(3) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1997).
97. 841 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (discussed in Ernest E. Figari,
Jr. et al., Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1677, 168687 (1994)).
98. Pierce, 841 S.W.2d at 881.
99. 929 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, n.w.h.).
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id. at 29. The court also pointed out that defendants' argument about the "preliminary" nature of the certification order ignored TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c), which states that the
"'determination [of the propriety of proceeding as a class] may be altered, amended, or
withdrawn at any time before final judgment."' Id.
102. Id. at 31; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1) ("As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall, after hearing, determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained.").
103. St. Louis, 929 S.W.2d at 31. Finding that this precise issue had not yet been addressed by Texas courts, the appellate court relied on federal authorities in concluding that
certification of a mandatory class action absent notice to those who might contest its nature
or creation constitutes a denial of due process. Id. at 31 and n.6. See, e.g., In re Temple,
851 F.2d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306
(6th Cir. 1984).
104. 925 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), rev'd, 933 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1996).
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an order changing a previously certified class from opt-out to mandatory
for settlement purposes. The court reasoned that the order certifying a
mandatory class only enlarged the size of the existing opt-out class and,
therefore, was no different than the situation addressed in Pierce.10 5 The
supreme court reversed, however, finding that a fundamental difference
existed between the situations in Pierce and De Los Santos.10 6 Although
new members were added to the class prior to trial in Pierce,the supreme
court noted that the relationship of class members to each other and their
attorneys in that case was not affected by the expansion. 10 7 In contrast,
changing the class from opt-out to mandatory in De Los Santos did not
simply enlarge its membership, it altered the fundamental nature of the
class. 10 8 To deny an interlocutory appeal in this situation, said the court,
would aggravate the concerns it had recently expressed in General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed'0 9 about the conflicts that may arise between the
class and its counsel, especially in relation to settlement. 1 0
Due in part to those concerns, the court in Bloyed affirmed the reversal
of a court-approved settlement of a class action involving over 645,000
owners of certain pickup trucks manufactured by GM.11 Although much
of the opinion in Bloyed is devoted to a discussion of the supreme court's
concerns about the potential for abuse of the class action procedure, particularly in the settlement context," 2 it ultimately concluded that the
court of appeals erred when it held that the settlement was not fair, adequate, or reasonable to the class members as a whole." 3 In discharging
its responsibility to determine whether a class action settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable," 4 "the trial court must examine both the substantive and procedural aspects of the settlement: (1) whether the terms
of the settlement are fair, adequate, and reasonable; and (2) whether the
settlement was the product of honest negotiations or of collusion."115
Based on its review of the record, the supreme court determined that the
trial court correctly analyzed the fairness of the settlement" 6 according
117
to the six factors enumerated in Ball v. Farm & Home Savings Ass'n.
Therefore, it held that the court of appeals improperly substituted its own
judgment for that of the trial court when it decided that the "potential
windfall" to GM outweighed the reasons supporting the class compro105. Id. at 65.
106. De Los Santos, 933 S.W.2d at 493.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996).
110. De Los Santos, 933 S.W.2d at 493.
111. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d at 951.
112. Id. at 952-55.
113. Id. at 956.
114. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(e) provides that a "class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court ....
115. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d at 955.
116. Id.
117. 747 S.W.2d 420, 423-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).

1524

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

mise. 118 Nevertheless, the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals'
judgment setting aside the settlement on the basis that class members did
not receive adequate notice of all of the material terms of the proposed
settlement, specifically the projected amount of attorney's fees and expenses. 119 According to the court, it was simply irrelevant that these fees
and expenses were to be paid directly by GM in an otherwise noncash
settlement, as opposed to being subtracted directly from the fund to be
distributed among the class members, because the combination of those
fees and the benefits conferred on the class by the settlement represented
a total dollar figure that the defendant was willing to pay to avoid litigation. 12 0 Observing that the potential conflict between absent class members and class counsel in these circumstances is "one of the serious
problems with class action settlements," the court held that class action
settlement notices must contain the maximum amount of attorney's fees
sought by class counsel and specify the proposed method of calculating
the award.' 2 ' The court also announced, as a general rule, that trial
courts in the future should not simply rely on affidavits in approving a
proposed settlement, but should conduct a plenary hearing with the opportunity for questioning by the court and vigorous cross-examination by
counsel representing objecting class members. 122
During the time it retains plenary power, a trial court may grant a new
trial even on its own motion. 12 3 According to the court in State & County
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Kelly,' 2 4 however, only a motion for new
trial filed by a party of record operates to automatically extend the trial
court's plenary power. 25 In contrast, a "'motion for new trial' filed by a
nonparty is simply an unofficial plea to the trial court to exercise its discretion under Rule 320 to set aside the judgment during the court's plenary power.' 26 Therefore, the court held that a trial court's order
granting a motion for new trial filed by a prospective intervenor was void
because neither it nor the order granting intervention was signed until
more than thirty days after the judgment was entered.' 2 7
VI.

PLEADINGS

Rule 63128 provides that an amended pleading may be filed within
seven days of trial only upon leave of court. Prior decisions of the Texas
Supreme Court make clear that a summary judgment hearing is a "trial"
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d at 955, 957.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 957-58.
Id. at 957.
Id at 958.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 320.
915 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, orig. proceeding).
Id at 227.
Id.
Id.

128.

TEX.

R. Civ. P. 63.
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for purposes of this rule.' 29 Two recent cases provided the court with new
opportunities to consider the rule's application in the summary judgment

context.
The question in Sosa v. Central Power & Light 130 was whether
Rule 4131 governs the computation of the time period set forth in Rule 63.
Concluding that it does, the court held that a party need not obtain leave
of court when the amended pleading is filed exactly seven days before the
summary judgment hearing. 132 In its opinion, the court acknowledged
that it had never before specifically dealt with this issue, and it appeared
to admit that the language of the rule was ambiguous. 133 The court
pointed out, however, that its comment to Rule 63 clearly evidences "our
intent to authorize amendment without leave of court if it is filed 'seven
days or more before the date of trial.""'134 The court also emphasized,
consistent with one of its prior decisions, 35 that Rule 4 "'applies to any
period of time prescribed by the rules of procedure.""'1 36 As a result of
this analysis, the Sosa court expressly disapproved the decisions of a
number of courts of appeals 37 that have held Rule 63 requires a full
38
seven days to elapse between the date of filing and the date of hearing.'
In ContinentalAirlines, Inc. v. Kiefer,139 the second amended petition
was filed only five days before the summary judgment hearing, so there
was no question the amendment was untimely unless filed with leave of
court. Reiterating the rule it announced in Goswami,'40 the supreme
court held that leave of court is presumed when a summary judgment
states that all pleadings were considered and when, as was the case in
Kiefer, "the record does not indicate that an amended pleading was not
considered, and the opposing party does not show surprise.' 14 1 With respect to the first condition, the court found it was satisfied by the "Kiefer
judgment's recital that the court, 'after examining the pleadings,'
con14 2
judgment."'
summary
to
entitled
was
Continental
that
cluded
129. See, e.g., Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988).
130. 909 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
131. TEX. R. Crv. P. 4 provides: "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by [the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure].... the day of the act, event, or default after
which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the
period so computed is to be included."
132. Sosa, 909 S.W.2d at 895.

133. Id.
134. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 63, cmt.
135. Lewis v. Blake, 876 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1994).

136. Sosa, 909 S.W.2d at 895.
137. See, e.g., Volvo Petroleum, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 717 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. App.-

Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Sweeny Bank v. Ritchie, Hopson & Assocs., Inc., 628
S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dillingham v.
Lynch, 516 S.W.2d 694, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Oehler v.
Oehler, 422 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
138. Sosa, 909 S.W.2d at 895.
139. 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
140. Goswami, 751 S.W.2d at 490.

141. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 276.
142. Id.
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Rule 93 requires that pleadings setting up a defect in parties must be
verified, "unless the truth of such matters appear of record. ' 143 Consistent with earlier decisions by other courts of appeals, Cantu v. Holiday
Inns, Inc.14 holds that the required verification may be supplied by an
attorney, where he or she has knowledge of the facts, 145 and that
although no recital of personal knowledge is necessary, there must at
least be some showing that the affidavit was based on personal knowledge. 146 The Cantu decision is noteworthy because of its additional holding that verification of the pleading is unnecessary if the asserted defect
in parties appears of record in the summary judgment evidence, as opposed to the pleading record. 147 The court observed that there "is a
dearth of case law in Texas dealing with the 'of record' exception to the
verification requirement in Rule 93. '' 148 Nonetheless, it agreed with the
decision in Lechuga v. Texas Employers' InsuranceAss'n, 14 9 the only case
it could apparently locate that had previously addressed the issue. 150 In
Lechuga, the Amarillo court of appeals rejected an argument that the "of
record" exception to the rule's verification requirement was limited to
the pleadings in the case in chief and did not encompass the summary
151
judgment pleadings and evidence or other evidence in the record.
VII. DISCOVERY
A.

PROCEDURES AND SCOPE

Since the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Loftin v. Martin,1 52 practitioners have routinely faced the objection that their Rule 167153 document requests are not specific enough unless they are phrased as requests
for particular documents or types of documents. During the Survey period, however, the Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 54 clari-

fied the Loftin rule in a way that should relieve much of the burden on
drafting document requests that are sufficiently specific when the requesting party does not know what types of documents her opponent
maintains. In K Mart, the court held that a request for "all documents
'which relate to, touch or concern the allegations of this lawsuit,"' as well
as requests for all documents "reflecting" or "relat[ing] in any way" to
143. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(4).
144. 910 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
145. Id. at 116. See Gorrell v. Tide Prods., Inc., 532 S.W.2d 390, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1975, no writ); TEX. R. Civ. P. 14.
146. Cantu, 910 S.W.2d at 116. See Reyna v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
883 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 897 S.W.2d 777
(Tex. 1995).
147. Cantu, 910 S.W.2d at 117.
148. Id. at 116.
149. 791 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied).
150. Cantu, 910 S.W.2d at 116-17.
151. Lechuga, 791 S.W.2d at 185-86.
152. 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989).
153. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167 (concerning discovery and production of documents).
154. 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 50 (Oct. 18, 1996).
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the incident in which the plaintiff was injured were not improper. 155 The
court distinguished its decision in Loftin, which it characterized as involving a request for all documents that supported a party's position or related to the claims and defenses. 156 The court found that in the case
before it the requests were for documents relating to a discrete incident
and that, while it would be better to be more specific, "a reasonable person would understand from the request what documents fit the description.' 57 The court also took the opportunity in K Mart to disabuse
practitioners of the impression, which they understandably received from
Loftin, that although document requests may not be used for the proverbial "fishing expedition," interrogatories and depositions may be used for
that purpose. 158 The court made clear that no discovery device can be
159
used merely to "fish."'
Many practitioners have also wrestled with the propriety of interrogatories asking not only for the identity of persons with knowledge of relevant facts, but also a statement of the facts known to such persons.
Several years ago, in Housing Authority of El Paso v. RodriquezYepez,' 60 the El Paso Court of Appeals held that an interrogatory requesting this additional information was inappropriate, and that the burden should be on the opposing party to depose the individuals named to
determine what knowledge they possess. 161 In denying the application
for writ of error, however, the Supreme Court expressly disclaimed that it
was approving this aspect of the lower court's holding.' 62 In Tjernagel v.
Roberts,163 the Amarillo Court of Appeals suggested a reasonable compromise approach to this issue. The court found that the objecting party
had not sustained its burden of proving that the interrogatory was overly
broad or unduly burdensome. 164 The court added in dicta that it did not
read the supreme court's comments in Housing Authority as mandating
that a party answering such an interrogatory must undertake an investigation of the knowledge possessed by each person it identifies as having
knowledge of relevant facts. 165 Instead, the court offered that "[i]f the
answering party is aware of that information, he should state it; if not, he
may so state.'166
155. Id. at 51.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see also Davis v. Pate, 915 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996,
orig. proceeding) (mandamus filed) (holding that requests for any and all documents pertaining in any way to subject matter of litigation were improper, while requests for any and
all documents pertaining to particular aspects or elements of claims, such as damages, were
proper).
158. K Mart, 40 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 52 (quoting Loftin, 776 S.W.2d at 148).
159. Id.
160. 828 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. App.-El Paso), writ deniedper curiam, 843 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.
1992).
161. El Paso, 828 S.W.2d at 501.
162. El Paso, 843 S.W.2d at 476.
163. 928 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, orig. proceeding).
164. Id. at 302.
165. Id. at 301-02.
166. Id. at 302.

1528

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

The supreme court addressed the withdrawal of Rule 169167 admissions
in Stelly v. Papania.168 One of the defendants in that case admitted that it
owned certain premises on which the plaintiff fell. 169 The trial court allowed the defendant to withdraw this admission when a survey later revealed that he had been mistaken, but the court of appeals reversed and
remanded for trial. 17 0 The supreme court noted that it had never before
addressed the question of party's attempted withdrawal of an express admission, and that all of the courts of appeals' decisions dealt with the
withdrawal of deemed admissions. 17 1 The court concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendant's mistaken
admission to be withdrawn because the defendant had shown "good
172
cause" for the withdrawal, and the plaintiff was not prejudiced.
Requests for admissions were also at issue in Carrasco v. Texas Transportation Institute.173 The defendant in that case, part of the Texas A&M
University System, argued that answers to requests for admissions prepared by the Texas attorney general's office on its behalf were not binding in light of Section 402.004 of the Texas Government Code. 174 That
statute provides that any admission or waiver made by the attorney general in a lawsuit in which the state is a party cannot prejudice the rights of
the state. 175 The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that the
statute did not exempt the defendant from compliance with the rules of
procedure. 176 The court reasoned that the purpose of requests for admissions is to clarify the facts, which would not prejudice the state. 177 If a
party did attempt to use requests for admissions for some improper purpose that would prejudice the state, the attorney general would be entitled to file a specific, timely objection under Rule 169.178
In 1990, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to require a
party to give notice if it intended to have persons other that the witness,
parties, spouses of parties, counsel, employees of counsel, and the court
reporter attend a deposition. 179 One of the few cases interpreting this
rule is Burrhus v. M&S Supply, Inc.180 The Burrhus court held that Rule
200(2)(a) does not contain any provision exempting expert witnesses
from its notice requirement, and a party must therefore provide notice if
an expert who is an independent contractor, rather than an employee of
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 169 (involving requests for admissions).
927 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1996).
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id. at 621-22 (citations omitted).
Id.at 622.
908 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 402.004 (Vernon 1990); Carrasco, 908 S.W.2d at 578.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 402.004 (Vernon 1990).
Carrasco, 908 S.W.2d at 578.
Id.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1); Carrasco,908 S.W.2d at 579.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 200(2)(a).
933 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
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counsel, will attend a deposition. 181 The court went on to hold, however,
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude
the expert from testifying at trial as a sanction for the violation of Rule
200(2)(a). 182 The court recognized that, even if notice had been given
have
and a motion for protective order filed, the district court would
183
likely allowed the expert to attend the deposition in any event.
Rule 167a allows a court, upon motion and for good cause shown, to
compel a party to submit to a mental examination if that party's mental
condition is in controversy.' 84 The supreme court has held that merely
pleading mental anguish damages is not sufficient to entitle the defendant
to a compulsory mental examination of the plaintiff. 85 Laub v. Millard186 holds, however, that if a plaintiff intends to offer her own expert
testimony of her mental condition, then the
defendant has good cause to
187
compel an examination under Rule 167a.
B.

PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS

The supreme court addressed the issue of "whether the attorney-client
privilege protects communications between a trustee and his or her attorney relating to trust administration from discovery by a trust beneficiary"
in Huie v. DeShazo.188 The court held that the trust beneficiary may not
discover otherwise privileged communications, notwithstanding the
trustee's fiduciary duties to the beneficiary.' 8 9 The court rejected the
beneficiary's argument that the trustee's duty of full disclosure extended
to such privileged communications, but noted that it is only the communications themselves, and not the facts known to the trustee or the attorney, that are protected from disclosure. 9° The court acknowledged that
its holding is at odds with a number of commentators and courts in other
jurisdictions, 191 but concluded that any exception to the privilege based
on the client's status as a fiduciary should be accomplished
by amend93
ment to Rule 503192 rather than judicial decision.'
181. Id. at 640.
182. Burrhus, 933 S.W.2d at 643.
183. Id at 643 n.8.
184. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a.
185. Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding).
186. 925 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding).
187. Id. at 364. The court also noted that, while a compelled mental examination might
not be particularly useful in determining the plaintiff's mental condition during the earlier
time period at issue in the lawsuit, plaintiff's own expert had only examined her afterwards
as well, and fundamental fairness required that defendant be entitled to rebut plaintiff's
expert with expert testimony of his own. Id. at 365.
188. 922 S.W.2d 920, 920 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 923.
191. Id. at 924 (citations omitted).
192. TEx. R. Crv. Evm. 503.
193. Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 924-25. The court further held that the work-product privilege
can also be asserted by the trustee against the beneficiary. Id. at 927. Indeed, since the
work-product privilege protects only materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, the
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Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez' 9 4 involved a conflict between the Texas
discovery rules and German privacy laws. 195 The plaintiff sought production of Volkswagen's current corporate telephone book, which the evidence adduced in the trial court demonstrated was protected by
Germany's privacy law. 196 The trial court ordered the telephone book
produced. 197 The supreme court, adopting the approach of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, held that the trial court should
have balanced the competing interests, taking into account such factors as
the specificity of the request, whether there are alternative means of securing the information, and the importance of the information to the litigation. 198 The high court concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to balance these interests. 19 9 Moreover, upon balancing the interests itself, the court held that the corporate phone book
200
should not be produced.
In a series of three opinions issued the same day, the Texas Supreme
Court discussed at length the medical peer review committee privilege. 20 1
The first case, Memorial Hospital-The Woodlands v. McCown,20 2 involved
a defamation claim by a physician in which the defendant sought records
from several hospitals relating to the physician's initial applications for
state privileges. 203 The court held that the peer review privilege extended
to this initial credentialing review. 204 The court carried this holding a
step further in Irving HealthcareSystem v. Brooks.20 5 There, a physician
sued for defamation, claiming that the defendants intentionally and maliciously supplied false information about him to the medical peer review
committees. 20 6 The court held that Memorial Hospital-The Woodlands
was controlling and that, absent a statutory waiver or exception, the communications to the committee were not discoverable in this situation
either. 20 7 Finally, the court followed Memorial Hospital-The Woodlands
in Brownwood Regional Hospital v. Eleventh Court of Appeals 20 8 as well,
holding that the records relating to the hospital's grant of staff privileges
policy reasons supporting a trustee's claim of confidentiality even as against the beneficiary
are stronger in the work-product context than the attorney-client privilege context. Id.
194. 897 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding), overruled sub
nom. Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995).
195. Id.at 901.
196. Id.at 901-02.
197. Id.at 902.
198. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 442(1)(a), (c)
(1987)).
199. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d at 903.
200. Id. at 902-03.
201. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.031, .032 (Vernon 1992); TEX.
REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, §§ 5.06(g), 0) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
202. 927 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).
203. Id. at 2-3.
204. Id. at 4.
205. 927 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996).
206. Id. at 14-15.
207. Id.at 15-16.
208. 927 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. 1996).
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to a physician were privileged even in a suit alleging malpractice
against
20 9
the physician and negligent credentialing against the hospital.
On rehearing in Tilton v. Marshall2 10 , the supreme court avoided ruling
21 1
on evangelist Robert Tilton's claim of a First Amendment privilege
with respect to his tithing records. 212 In its original opinion, discussed in
the 1996 Annual Survey,213 the court held that production of the tithing
records would not violate Tilton's right of free exercise of religion or freedom of association. 21 4 The court did not reach this issue on rehearing,
however, because it granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court
to dismiss all of the claims against Tilton except for a narrow fraud claim
and then concluded that the tithing records had no potential relevance to
this remaining claim.2 15 Although lack of relevance will not normally satisfy the strict standard for obtaining a writ of mandamus, the court concluded that the highly sensitive nature of the tithing records justified the
2 16
relief in this case.
The physician-patient privilege was at issue in two noteworthy cases
decided during the Survey period. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Hancock 217 the court held that Rule 509(d)(4) 21 8 creates an exception to the
privilege "whenever any party relies upon the condition of a patient as a
part of that party's claim or defense. 21 9 The peculiar feature of Hancock
was that the patient was not a party to the suit; instead, a physician was
suing a manufacturer of breast implants claiming loss of income and in220
jury to reputation in connection with the allegedly defective implants.
The court discussed that the patient records sought by the defendant
seemingly fell within the exception to the privilege, since the condition of
the doctor's implant patients appeared to be directly at issue. 221 The
court held, however, that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
denying the defendant access to these records because it could not predict
in advance how the physician intended to present his case, or what evidence the trial court would admit, and therefore it could not rule out the
possibility that a fair trial could be conducted without the requested
222
information.
209. Id. at 25. The court noted that it was not deciding whether a cause of action for
negligent credentialing exists in Texas. Id. at 26 n.1.
210. 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996).
211.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

212. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 682.
213. See 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 1385.
214. Tilton v. Marshall, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1140, 1146 (Aug. 1, 1995), withdrawn and
superseded, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996).
215. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 682.
216. Id. at 682-83.
217. 921 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding).
218. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 509(d)(4).
219. Hancock, 921 S.W.2d at 921 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 919.
221. Id. at 922-23.
222. Id. at 923.
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The court in Buchanan v. Mayfield 223 also examined the express language of Rule 509,224 as well as the Medical Practice Act, 225 in concluding
that a dentist is not a physician under Texas law and cannot, therefore,
claim a privilege for communications with his patients. 226 The court
brushed aside the dentist's arguments that he should be considered a phy-

sician for purposes of Rule 509 because he performs some of the same

functions as a medical doctor, such as prescribing drugs and performing
oral surgery. 227 All of these functions are also properly the province of

dentists under Texas law, the court noted, and did not make the defend228

ant a doctor.
General Motors Corp. v. Gayle229 and Dillard Department Stores, Inc.

v. Sanderson230 addressed the application of two of the litigation privileges under Rule 166b.231 In General Motors, the court held that a trial
court's order that the plaintiffs be allowed to attend any crash test performed by General Motors' consulting experts if General Motors intended to use that test, or any similar test performed later with plaintiffs
in attendance, impinged the fundamental policy behind the consulting expert privilege. 232 In Dillard Department Stores, the court looked to federal authority in concluding that a witness's lack of recollection of events

about which she gave a statement to counsel for the defendant (her former employer) five years before satisfied the substantial need and undue
hardship exception to the witness statement privilege. 233
As discussed in the 1996 Annual Survey,234 the Texas Supreme Court
held in Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson235 that a party's obligation to specifi-

cally plead and prove privilege objections is triggered only by "an appropriate discovery request"; thus, a privilege objection is not waived by
failing to assert it in response to an overbroad document request. 236
Young v.

Ray2 3 7

clarifies that this decision does not create a "'good cause

per se' rule" for late privilege objections. 238 Instead, Texaco envisions a
223. 925 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).

224.

TEX.

R. Civ.

EVID.

509.

225. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1997).
226. Buchanan, 925 S.W.2d at 138.
227. Id. at 138.
228. Id. The court also noted that the dentist's public policy arguments should be directed to the legislature or supreme court, who would have the authority to amend the
applicable statutes or rules of evidence. Id. at 140.
229. 924 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]) (per curiam).
230. 928 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
231. TEX. R. Cv. P. 166b.
232. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(b); GeneralMotors, 924 S.W.2d at 230-31. The court held,
however, that General Motors had not demonstrated that any error could not be remedied
on appeal and, therefore, denied mandamus relief. Id. at 231.
233. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(c), (e); Dillard Department Stores, 928 S.W.2d at 321-22.
234. 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 1385.
235. 898 S.W.2d at 813 (Tex. 1995).
236. Id. at 815.
237. 916 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]).
238. Id. at 3.
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two-step procedure: first, the responding party must timely object to the
overbroad request; and second, once the court determines the appropri239
ate scope of the request, the party must assert its privilege objection.
The responding party in Young did not timely assert any objections that
the requests were improper, and all such objections, including its privi240
lege objections, were therefore waived.

C. DUTY

TO SUPPLEMENT

2 41
The Texas Supreme Court strongly suggested in Collins v. Collins
that there is no general duty to supplement a fact witness's deposition
testimony.2 42 The court of appeals in this divorce case had held that the
husband's and his partner's testimony regarding the value of their corporations should have been excluded because: (1) they were not designated
as experts; (2) they testified in their depositions that they had no opinions
as to value and would offer none at trial; and (3) the husband's attorney
agreed to notify the wife's attorney if they changed their minds. 243 The
dissent in the lower court argued, however, that the valuation testimony
was lay opinion, not expert opinion, and that the husband therefore had
no duty to supplement his or his partner's deposition testimony. 2 "4 The
supreme court stated that it did not read the court of appeals' opinion "to
require supplementation of a fact witness' deposition testimony generally,
or in any situation other than when a witness renders an expert opinion,"
24 5
and on that basis denied the application for writ of error.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held in Garza v. Murray246 that a
trial resetting has the effect of nullifying a deadline for designating expert
witnesses imposed by a docket control order, unless the deadline was imposed as a sanction for prior discovery abuse. 247 The court also provided
some comfort for practitioners concerned about how much detail they
must provide in answering expert witness interrogatories. The defendant
in Garza responded to a standard expert witness interrogatory by stating
that his expert would opine that the plaintiffs claimed repressed memories were invalid and untrue, and that this opinion was based on the ex-

239. Id. at 4.
240. Id.
241. 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
242. Id.
243. Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792, 799-802 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist]
1995)(en banc), writ denied per curiam, 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996).
244. Id. at 806-07 (Hedges, J., dissenting). The dissent also dismissed the apparent
breach of the agreement by the husband's attorney to notify the wife's attorney if the
husband or his partner were going to testify as to value by noting that such agreement was
unenforceable under Rule 11. Id. at 807-08; TEx. R. Civ. P. 11 (agreement between attorneys touching on subject matter of suit will not be enforced unless it is in writing, signed,
and filed with the court, or made on the record in open court).
245. Collins, 923 S.W.2d at 569.
246. 915 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding).
247. Id. at 550; accord Revco, D.S., Inc. v. Cooper, 873 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. App.-E!
Paso 1994, orig. proceeding); Pope v. Davidson, 849 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
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pert's knowledge of the plaintiff's psychological background and the
defendant's personality and character. 248 The court of appeals concluded
that this was a sufficient response, notwithstanding that it did not identify
249
the specific facts on which the expert was relying.

D.

SANCTIONS

The supreme court once again spoke on the issue of "death penalty"
sanctions (e.g., striking pleadings, default judgments) in Hamill v.
Level.250 Utilizing the standard it first articulated in TransAmerican National Gas Corp. v. Powell,251 the court held that the sanction imposed in
Hamill was more severe than necessary, and the sanctioned conduct did
not justify the presumption that the plaintiff's claims lacked merit.2 52 Significantly, in doing so, the court specifically disapproved of the court of
appeals' conclusion that a trial court need not, as a general rule, actually
test the efficacy of lesser sanctions before imposing death penalty
25 3
sanctions.
The court in Marshallv. Ryder System, Inc. 254 acknowledged that death
penalty sanctions normally may not be imposed until lesser sanctions
have been tried. 255 The court was faced, however, with a plaintiff who
had deliberately and systematically tampered with crucial evidence by
pouring diesel fuel down groundwater monitoring wells installed by the
defendant, and who then invoked his Fifth Amendment 256 privilege in
refusing to answer questions relating to his conduct. 257 Because this
"spiking" of the monitoring wells went to the heart of plaintiff's claim, the
court held that this particular species of discovery abuse was so extraordinary that no sanction apart from dismissal would have been
258
appropriate.
VIII. DISMISSAL

In Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co.,259 the supreme court,
in a per curiam opinion, held that the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing the plaintiffs' case for want of prosecution where their counsel
properly justified his failure to appear at trial. 260 The Smith case involved
248. Garza, 915 S.W.2d at 551.
249. Id.
250. 917 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. 1996).
251. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
252. Hamill, 917 S.W.2d at 16.
253. Id. at 16 n.1. Compare In Re Estate of Riggins, 937 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. App.Amarillo, 1996, n.w.h.) (sanction of excluding all witnesses other than proponents of will,
without lesser sanction first having been imposed, was not a death penalty sanction and
would satisfy TransAmerican standard in any event).
254. 928 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
255. Id. at 197 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1992)).
256. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
257. Marshall, 928 S.W.2d at 194.
258. Id. at 197.
259. 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
260. Id. at 468.
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a suit by an injured employee and his wife as plaintiffs, and his employer's
workers' compensation carrier as intervenor, against the employer. After
requesting and obtaining a trial setting, the plaintiffs' attorney then requested a trial setting for the same date in an unrelated case. 261 Twelve
days before trial, the plaintiffs' attorney filed an unverified motion for
continuance in Smith that incorrectly represented that the competing case
was older and preferentially set.262 The trial court denied the continuance, and the plaintiffs' attorney never requested
another continuance or
2 63
mentioned the conflict to the other trial court.
Neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel appeared for trial; however, the
attorney for the workers' compensation insurer appeared and re-urged
the continuance.2 64 Still unpersuaded, the trial court again denied the
continuance and dismissed the case on the defendant's motion.2 65 Finding that the trial court abused its discretion, the supreme court reversed,
noting that the conduct at issue did not violate Rule 165a(3). 266 The
court held that, while the plaintiffs' counsel was not as conscientious as he
should have been, his failure to appear was not intentional or the result of
conscious indifference, but was instead reasonably explained by his attendance at another trial. 267 While the court did not condone the misstatements of plaintiffs' counsel in his motion for continuance regarding
the other trial setting being older and preferential, it held that sanctions
were the proper remedy for such conduct, not dismissal or denial of
268
reinstatement.
Neither the plaintiff nor his counsel fared as well in Spearman v. Texas
Department of Corrections.2 69 In Spearman, the plaintiff's counsel requested a jury trial and obtained a trial setting approximately five months
later.270 The plaintiff's counsel then moved for a continuance, which it
appears the court did not receive until the day after the case was called
for trial.27 1 After the trial court apparently denied the continuance and
dismissed the case, the plaintiffs counsel moved for reinstatement and/or
new trial and attached as an exhibit evidence of a conflicting trial due to
an "agreed setting" in another criminal case on the same date. 272 Finding
no evidence that the plaintiff's counsel had immediately brought the conflict to the attention of the trial court as required under the local rules,
the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the case for want of prosecution, especially since the plaintiff's
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id.

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

TEx. R. Civ. P. 165a(3); Smith, 913 S.W.2d at 468.
Id.
Id.
918 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, no writ).
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 467.
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counsel created the conflict by agreeing to the competing trial setting. 273
Plaintiffs in Scott & White Memorial Hospital v. Schexnider274 filed
medical malpractice claims against numerous doctors among others.
Shortly after all defendants moved for summary judgment, plaintiffs nonsuited twenty-nine of the defendants. The trial court subsequently
granted a final summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants,
whereupon all of the defendants, including those who had been nonsuited, filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 13.275 The trial
court, still acting within its plenary jurisdiction, granted the motions and
ordered plaintiff's counsel to pay $25,000 in sanctions to the nonsuited
defendants. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that a trial court
does not have jurisdiction over a post-nonsuit sanctions motion because
Rule 162 speaks only to the effect of a nonsuit on a motion for sanctions
pending at the time of dismissal. 2 76 The supreme court disagreed, holding
that the time period during which the trial court has authority to impose
sanctions does not expire until thirty days after the judgment has been
signed. 277 Although any action taken by the trial court after its jurisdiction has expired is null and void, 278 a trial court's power to decide a motion for sanctions is no different than its power to decide any other
motion during its plenary jurisdiction. 27 9 According to the court,
"Rule 162 merely acknowledges that a nonsuit does not affect the trial
court's authority to act on a pending sanctions motion; it does not purport
'2 80
to limit the trial court's power to act on motions filed after a nonsuit.
In another sanctions case, Hilliardv. Bennett,2 81 the court conditionally
granted a writ of mandamus and reversed a sanction award where the
trial court had, sua sponte, sanctioned attorneys who filed sixteen cases
against the same defendants, on behalf of different individual plaintiffs,
allegedly injured in the same accident. Before serving the defendants, the
attorneys nonsuited all of the cases, except one. 282 However, the trial
court in which the first of the sixteen cases had been filed refused to grant
the nonsuit and, instead, issued an order abating dismissal. 283 The trial
court also ordered the attorneys to appear and show cause why they
should not be sanctioned for violating the local rules regarding the ran273. Id. at 24-25.
274. 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 198 (Dec. 13, 1996).
275. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.

276. 906 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-Austin), rev'd in part, affd in part, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.

198, 198 (Dec. 13, 1996). TEX. R. Civ. P. 162, which permits a nonsuit anytime before the
plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence, also provides that:
"[a] dismissal under this rule shall have no effect on any motion for sanctions, attorney's
fees or other costs, pending at the time of dismissal, as determined by the court."
277. Scott, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 199; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d), (e) (trial court's
plenary power to act in a case lasts until thirty days after the judgment has been signed).
278. Scott, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 199; see also First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251,
252 (Tex. 1984); Ex parte Olivares, 662 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. 1983).
279. Scott, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 199.
280. Id.
281. 925 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding).
282. Id. at 340.
283. Id.
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dom assignment of cases. 284 Following a hearing in which the trial court
questioned witnesses and overruled challenges to the court's jurisdiction,
as well as the attorneys' assertions of their Fifth Amendment 285 rights,
the trial court sanctioned the attorneys $10,000 under Rule 13.286
In conditionally granting the writ of mandamus, the court of appeals
first held that a party's right to nonsuit is absolute, and the trial court
therefore erred in denying that request. 287 The court further held, albeit
based upon precedent since overruled in Schexnider,2 88 that the trial
court lost its jurisdiction to sanction the attorneys upon the filing of the
nonsuit. 289 Finally, the court further found that the trial judge violated
the attorneys' due process rights when he sua sponte convened the hearing, examined witnesses, and issued the sanction order, thereby depriving
the relators of a "neutral and detached judge" 290 who should be "fair and
impartial and1 should act neither as an advocate for any party nor as an
29
adversary."
In Harris v. Moore,292 the court held that a trial court erred in dismissing a bill of review for pleading defects. In this case, the trial court
originally entered a default judgment against the appellant who challenged that judgment by a bill of review. 293 Finding defects in the appellant's pleadings, the trial court dismissed the bill. 294 The court of appeals

reversed, noting that the proper mechanism to challenge such pleading
defects is normally a special exceptions hearing and that petitioners
the opportunity to amend their pleadings to cure
should have been given
295
any pleading defects.
The court in Harrisalso held that the trial court erred in dismissing the
bill of review at the pretrial hearing stage where the petitioner was only
required to present prima facie proof of a meritorious defense to obtain a
trial on the merits of the bill. 296 The trial court's decision to dismiss the

bill of review at the pretrial hearing phase was, said the court, "akin to a
barring a sprinter from a race for running a slow
track-meet official
'297
warmup

lap."

284. Id.
285. U.S. CONST. amend V.
286. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; Hilliard, 925 S.W.2d at 340.

287. Id.
288. Schexnider, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 199 n.2.

289. Hilliard, 925 S.W.2d at 341. The Hilliard trial court, however, did not issue its
sanction award until well after its plenary jurisdiction had expired following the nonsuit.
Id.
290. Id. (citing Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied)).

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
912 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 863.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT

When a trial court grants summary judgment on specific grounds, the
supreme court has held that its consideration on appeal is limited to the
grounds upon which the trial court granted summary judgment and the
court of appeals affirmed.2 98 Texas courts of appeals have similarly limited their review of summary judgments. 299 One justification offered by
the courts for such a limited consideration has been that "[a]ffirming a
summary judgment on an independent ground not specifically considered
by the trial court usurps the trial court's authority to consider and rule on
court of the benefit of the trial
issues before it and denies the30appellate
0
court's decision on the issue."
Cincinnati Life Insurance Co. v. Cates301 announces a significant
change in this longstanding appellate practice. In Cates, the defendants
moved for summary judgment on several grounds. The trial court
granted the motions on the basis of certain of the enumerated grounds,
but denied them as to the others. The judgment, however, disposed of all
grounds and was final. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment as to the grounds relied upon by the trial court. Based on the existing appellate practice, the court of appeals refused to consider the
defendants' cross-points asking it to affirm the judgment on the basis of
the grounds the trial court had expressly denied. The Texas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that appellate courts "should consider all summary judgment grounds the trial court [expressly] rules on and the movant preserves for appellate review that are necessary for final disposition
of the appeal. '30 2 In dictum, the court further concluded that the appellate court may, in the interest of judicial economy, consider other grounds
for appellate review and that the trial court
that the movant preserved
30 3
did not address.
To arrive at this result, the supreme court was required to distinguish
several of its own prior decisions. In Novak v. Stevens, 30 4 for example,
the court referred to the general rule that a denial of a summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal because it is not a final judgment. 30 5
The Cates court contrasted the situation where a trial court grants summary judgment on grounds that dispose of all the non-movant's claims:
there the judgment becomes final, regardless of whether the trial court
298. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993) (plurality
opinion); Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1992).
299. See, e.g., Maley v. 7111 Southwest Freeway, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); In re Estate of Canales, 837 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).

300. State Farm, 858 S.W.2d at 381.
301. 927 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1996).

302. Id. at 626 (emphasis added); see TEx. R. APP. P. 90(a) (court of appeals' opinion

shall address every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal).
303. Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 626.
304. 596 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1990).

305. Id. at 849.
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rules on the other grounds. 30 6 Accordingly, the general rule should not
apply under those circumstances. 30 7 In Delaney v. University of Houston,30 8 the supreme court had also limited its consideration to the grounds
30 9
upon which the trial court actually granted the summary judgment.
The Cates court pointed out that it had declined to address the additional
grounds raised in Delaney310 only because it believed them immaterial
and the record was not well developed on those issues. 3 11 But, the court
hastened to add that it had not in that case considered whether the court
of appeals could dispose of the case on summary judgment grounds that
the trial court did not rule on.3 12 The Cates court further observed that
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. V. S.S., 3 13 another case in which it had
limited its review to the summary judgment grounds granted by the court,
was merely a plurality opinion that was not binding precedent on the
court.3 14 It also noted that the concurring and dissenting opinions in that
case 3 15 supported the view that an appellate court may consider other
grounds not addressed by the trial court in the interest of judicial economy. 316 Finally, the court in Cates also cited various procedural rules as
3 17
additional support for its newly-announced, broader form of review.
Two cases decided during the Survey period involved issues of summary judgment evidence. In Noriega v. Mireles,318 the court held that an
it
expert's affidavit was competent summary judgment proof even though3 19
belief.
and
knowledge
best
my
to
correct
and
"true
as
to
was sworn
Although the court acknowledged the general rule that affidavits must be
based on the affiant's personal knowledge, 320 it observed that the special
evidentiary rules governing experts 321 contemplate that an expert may
rely on certain types of inadmissible facts or data in forming an opinion
that are not within his "personal knowledge" in the truest sense of the
words. 322 By detailing the voluminous medical records he reviewed,
which in a medical malpractice case is often times the only means by
which an expert can gain knowledge regarding the patient's treatment,
the expert "showed ... he had [sufficient] 'personal knowledge' of the
306. Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 625.
307. Id.
308. 835 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1992).
309. Id. at 58.
310. Id. at 58-59.
311. Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 626.
312. Id.
313. 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993) (plurality opinion).
314. Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 626.
315. State Farm, 858 S.W.2d at 382, 387 (Phillips, C.J., concurring; Cornyn, J., concurring; Hecht, J., dissenting).
316. Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 625.
317. Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 626; see TEX. R. App. P. 80(b), 81(c), 180, 182(a).
318. 925 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ requested).
319. Id. at 264-65.
320. Id. at 263. See Humphreys v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. 1994).
321. See TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 702, 703.
322. Noriega, 925 S.W.2d at 264-65.
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facts to meet the requirements of Rule 166a(f)." 323 The court also
brushed off the defendant's complaint that the affidavit was defective because it failed to attach the medical records referenced in the affidavit. 324

Declining to follow one of its sister courts, 325 the Noriega court held that
this was merely a formal defect that could not be asserted for the first
time on appeal because there was no dispute regarding the contents of
those records. 326 In Lara v. Tri-Coastal Contractors,Inc.,327 however, the

same court reiterated the general rule that "expert testimony comprised
of wholly conclusory statements is insufficient to support summary

judgments." 328

As discussed in a previous section of this Survey, 329 the supreme court
in Sosa v. Central Power & Light330 held that an amended pleading filed
exactly seven days before a summary judgment hearing is timely under
Rule 63.331 Glasscock v. Frost National Bank 332 makes clear that Sosa's
holding also extends to summary judgment responses filed under Rule
166a. 33 3 The question in Thomas v. Medical Arts Hospital of Texarkana,
Inc. 334 was whether a defendant who initially failed to respond to a mo-

tion for summary judgment obtained a second opportunity to do so when
the hearing originally scheduled was postponed because of one party's

bankruptcy filing. 335 After the bankruptcy case was dismissed, the trial
court rescheduled the motion for hearing. The defendant filed his written
response to the motion more than seven days before the date of the rescheduled hearing, but the trial court refused to consider the response.
The court of appeals decided that the trial judge had erred in this regard,
and held that the response was timely-filed in accordance with

Rule 166a(c). 336 The purpose of the filing time requirement, said the
court, "is to give a party adequate time to prepare for the summary judg323. Id. at 265. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f) (affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein).
324. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f) provides: "Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith."
325. See Ceballos v. El Paso Health Care Sys., 881 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1994, writ denied) (failure to attach sworn or certified copies of medical records to expert
affidavit was defect in substance, not form).
326. Noriega, 925 S.W.2d at 265. Consonant with Ceballos, however, the court agreed
that the affidavit would have been substantively defective if there had been a dispute as to
what the medical records contained. Id.
327. 925 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
328. Id. at 279. See also Anderson v. Snider, 808 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex. 1991); Mercer v.
Daoran Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. 1984).
329. See supra note 130-38 and accompanying text.
330. 909 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1995).
331. Id. at 895; TEX. R. Civ. P. 63 (pleading offered within seven days of trial shall be
filed only after leave of court is obtained).
332. 928 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
333. Id. at 600; TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) provides that, except on leave of court, the
adverse party may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response not less than
seven days prior to the day of hearing.
334. 920 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
335. Id. at 817.
336. Id. at 818; TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
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ment hearing," not to snare the unwary or merely punish the dilatory. 337
Because the defendant filed his response more than seven days before the
338
hearing, the plaintiff had adequate opportunity to prepare.
The plaintiffs in Grant v. Wood 339 sued HBO, Time Warner and others
for defamation and other harm allegedly suffered as a result of a television documentary. Defendants moved for summary judgment based in
part on the free speech and free press clauses of the state and federal
341
constitutions 340 and § 73.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Although the legislature has authorized interlocutory appeals from summary judgment determinations in these circumstances, 342 the trial court
refused to rule on the defendants' motion for summary judgment thereby
preventing any interlocutory appeal. 343 Finding that the trial court's refusal to rule was expressly intended to prevent an interlocutory appeal, 3 "
the appellate court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the district judge to rule on the motion before trial. 345 The court's
opinion admits that a district judge "unquestionably has some discretion
in the manner in which it rules on [summary judgment] motions," and
that an appellate court may not prescribe the manner in which this discretion is exercised. 346 Nevertheless, the court held that a trial court's refusal to rule on a timely submitted motion for summary judgment for the
express purpose of precluding a statutory interlocutory appeal constitutes
347
a clear abuse of discretion.
X. JURY PRACTICE
TWo appellate courts addressed the issue of Edmonson34s challenges to
49
peremptory strikes in jury selection based upon race. In Price v. Short,3
which involved an altercation between a white film crew worker and an
African-American Dallas County Commissioner, the court held that the
prohibitions against race-based juror selection apply to all races, and not
just minorities. 35 0 The plaintiff in Price successfully sued the Dallas
County Commissioner for a broken ankle sustained during a fight and
337. Thomas, 920 S.W.2d at 818.

338. Id.
339. 916 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
340. U.S. CONST. amend. I; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
341. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.002 (Vernon 1986).
342. Id. § 51.014(6) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
343. Grant, 916 S.W.2d at 45.
344. Id. The trial court's underlying motivation is apparently of no consequence as the
court observed that the district judge's refusal was "well-intentioned and based on her
legitimate concern [over] not losing a trial setting on a case that was apparently difficult to
manage." Id.
345. Id. at 46.
346. Id. at 45.
347. Id.

348. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 615 (1991) (extending to civil
suits the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) that a party may not use its
peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner).
349. 931 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
350. Id. at 683.
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received an award of $113,838.01 in damages. 351 The defendant appealed
arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in granting the
plaintiff's Edmonson challenges to certain of his peremptory strikes of

white veniremembers because Batson352 and its progeny do not apply to

the striking of white or "majority" veniremembers. 35 3 The court disagreed on two separate bases. First, because the defendant had only
raised this argument for the first time on appeal, the court ruled that he

had waived any error on that point. 354 Second, considering the merits of
the argument, the court noted that the Supreme Court did not expressly
limit its holding regarding improper peremptory strikes in Batson to racial minorities. 355 The court examined the intent and history of Batson
and concluded that its goal was to ensure that parties used nondiscriminatory criteria in selecting jurors. 356 Thus, while Batson arose in the context
of a response to historical prejudice against racial minorities, its holding
remained applicable to the selection of jurors of all races. 357 Therefore,

the court concluded, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the plaintiff's challenges where the defendant's proffered reason
for his peremptory strikes of white veniremembers, while facially neutral,
could have been determined to be a sham or pretext for a discriminatory
358
purpose.
Focusing on the evidentiary aspect of an Edmonson challenge, the
court in Goode v. Schoukfeh, 359 upheld the trial court's decision to overrule a plaintiffs challenge to the defendants' four peremptory strikes of

three African-Americans and one Hispanic veniremembers. 360 The court

noted that to succeed on an Edmonson challenge, the challenging party
must first make a prima facie showing of intent to discriminate. 36 1 The

burden then shifts to the striking party to articulate its reasons for the

strike. 362 The challenging party must then prove that the stated reason is
351. Id. at 680.
352. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
353. Price, 931 S.W.2d at 682.
354. Id. See TEx. R. App. P. 52(a) ("In order to preserve a complaint for appellate
review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion,
stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific
grounds were not apparent from the context.").
355. Price, 931 S.W.2d at 682.
356. Id. at 683.
357. Id. at 684. The court also noted its disagreement with what it termed as "dicta" in
the ruling of two other courts that Batson only applies to racial minority veniremembers.
Id. at 683.
358. Id. at 684-85. The trial court found the defendant's stated reasons of striking two
venirepersons based on their employment to be pretextual because the defendant's attorney never questioned those prospective jurors about their occupations, which can be considered as some evidence of racial discrimination. Id. at 685; see Esteves v. State, 859
S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd.).
359. 915 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996), aff'd, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 487 (Apr. 18,
1997).
360. Id. at 668.
361. Id. at 669 n.3.
362. Id.
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a pretext or sham.363 On appeal, the standard of review is a deferential
one that will allow the trial court's decision to stand unless it is "clearly
'364
wrong.
In this case, upon reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the
trial court did not err because the plaintiff's attorney offered only his own
unsworn personal observations and conclusions and did not offer any sub365
stantive evidence to prove his allegation of discriminatory intent.
Moreover, even accepting the statements of the plaintiff's counsel as true,
the court nonetheless noted that defendants' counsel properly articulated
nondiscriminatory reasons for their strikes and had not excluded from the
jury other minority veniremembers.3 66 Therefore, the court36 7affirmed the
trial court's decision overruling the Edmonson challenges.
Several courts explored the bounds of a party's right to a jury trial during the Survey period. Most significantly, in a case of first impression, the
supreme court in Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne 368 held that a trial
court abused its discretion in denying a defendant's right to a jury trial
where the plaintiff had requested a jury trial but never paid the fee, and
the trial court had previously issued an order, which it never rescinded,
setting the case on the jury docket. 369 The court held that where one
party demands a jury trial but fails to pay the fee, the other party may not
rely upon the demand in expecting a jury trial. 370 However, a party may,
as a matter of law, rely upon a trial court's order setting a case for jury
trial.37 1 Accordingly, if a trial court vacates or changes its order setting a
case on the jury docket, it must then give the parties "a reasonable time
to comply with Rule 216 requirements for making a jury demand and
'372
paying the fee."
In General Motors Corp. v. Gayle,373 on the other hand, the court held
that a defendant's petition for writ of mandamus was not a proper mechanism to obtain a continuance in order to allow its request for a jury trial
to become timely.3 74 In Gayle, another party had requested a jury but
had not paid the jury fee, following which the trial court refused a continuance and called the case to trial on its non-jury docket. 375 Noting that
while under certain circumstances a trial court could err in denying a continuance to allow a jury request to become timely, e.g., where the trial
court's personnel contributed to a party's misunderstanding that a case
363. Id.
364. Id. at 669.
365. Id. at 671.
366. Id. at 671-72.
367. Id. at 673.
368. 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996).
369. Id. at 665.
370. Id. at 666; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 220.
371. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d at 666.
372. Id.; TEX. R. Civ. P. 216(a).
373. 924 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding [leave
denied)).
374. Id. at 225.
375. Id.
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was set for jury trial, in this case the evidence did not support such a
conclusion. 376 Therefore, noting that it was "aware of no Texas case in
which mandamus had been granted for the denial of a continuance to
allow a jury request to become timely," the court denied the writ of mandamus, concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated that its rem377
edy on appeal would be inadequate.
Regarding the required number of jurors, the court in City of Jersey
Village v. CampbelP78 held that a trial court erred in denying a party its
constitutional right to a jury trial3 79 when it denied a motion for mistrial
and forced a case to trial with only eleven jurors. 380 In this case, because
one of the parties objected to less than twelve jurors, and the dismissed
juror was not "disabled" as defined under Rule 292,381 the court should
382
have granted a mistrial.
The court in Branham v. Brown 383 held that a trial court erred in returning a jury to re-deliberate after it had issued its verdict, announced it
in court, and been polled and then released. 384 Originally, the jury
reached an 11-1 verdict for the defendant, which the trial court accepted. 385 Immediately after releasing the jury, the judge invited the jurors into his chambers to greet them. 38 6 The judge also invited the parties
and attorneys to remain so the jurors could ask questions if they so desired. 387 In the context of this setting, one juror volunteered that she
"made a mistake during the polling [and] ...had mistakenly signed the
verdict because of a misunderstanding. ' 388 The trial court immediately
stopped the conversation, advised the attorneys, and returned the jurors
to the jury room to re-deliberate and sign the verdict consistent with their
decision. 389 The jury then returned with a 10-2 verdict in favor of the
defendant, following which the plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new
trial. 39° Affirming the take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff, the appellate court reformed the verdict, holding that the trial court erred in
causing the jury to re-deliberate:
[A]fter a verdict is returned and is officially received by the court
and the jury is discharged, it is not permissible to thereafter establish
jury misconduct and impeach the verdict by presenting evidence that
the verdict was not unanimous or that a non-unanimous verdict was
376. Id. at 226.
377. Id. at 227.
378. 920 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
379. TEX. CONST. art. V., § 13.
380. Campbell, 920 S.W.2d at 697, 698.
381. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
382. Campbell, 920 S.W.2d at 698.
383. 925 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
384. Id. at 368.

385. Id. at 367.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 368.

389. Id
390. Id.
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returned by different or 'shifting' majorities. 39 1
In examining the issue of potential juror misconduct in light of Rule
226,392 the supreme court in Pharo v. Chambers County, Texas 393 held
that the trial court properly denied a motion for new trial for alleged
juror misconduct when a juror socialized with her boyfriend, a deputy
sheriff, during the trial in which his employer, the county, was a defendant. During the trial, the juror dined with her boyfriend at least three
times and met for coffee with other employees of the sheriff's department
on two of the mornings of a four-day trial. 394 Both the juror and her

boyfriend testified that they never discussed the case with each other, and
the juror further testified that she did not discuss the case with any other
county employees. 395 Since the fact of the meetings was undisputed, the
appellate court focused its review on whether the boyfriend's status with
the county alone rendered his conduct improper under Rule 226a(II). 396
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the court reasoned that "not every
employee of a county is automatically [deemed] 'interested' in a case in
which the county is a party. '397 Moreover, as the juror's boyfriend had
no personal involvement in the underlying incident or subsequent investigation of the matters made the subject of the dispute, the juror did not
399
violate Rule 226398 in associating with her boyfriend during trial.

The court also briefly addressed a stray remark made by the bailiff to
the veniremembers during voir dire. 400 While the court found the bailiff's
conduct violative of Rule 283, 4 01 the court ruled that the comment did
40 2
not result in probable injury to the plaintiff so as to justify a new trial.
XI. JURY CHARGE
In a pair of per curiam opinions handed down the same day, the
supreme court acknowledged a flaw in the Texas Pattern Jury Charge for
premises liability. 40 3 In both cases, the trial court instructed the jury that
it could find liability if the defendant "failed to adequately warn [the
plaintiff] of the [dangerous] condition or to make the condition reason391. Id. (citing Jones v. Square Deal Cab Co., 501 S.W.2d 746, 747-48 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 506 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1974)).
392. TEX. R. Crv. P. 226.

393. 922 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1996).
394. Id. at 947.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 949; TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a(II). Under this rule, jurors receive the following
admonishment immediately after selection: "Do not mingle with nor talk to the lawyers,
witnesses, the parties, or any other person who might be connected with or interested in this
case .... " TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a(II) (emphasis added).
397. Pharo,922 S.W.2d at 949.
398. TEX. R. Civ. P. 226.
399. Pharo, 922 S.W.2d at 949.
400. Id. at 949-50.
401. TEX. R. Civ. P. 283.

402. Pharo,922 S.W.2d at 950.
403. 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PAT-FERN JURY CHARGES PJC 66.05 (1994); State
v. Williams, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 61 (Oct. 18, 1996) (per curiam); City of San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 48 (Oct. 18, 1996) (per curiam).
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ably safe."'40 4 Although this instruction tracked the pattern jury charge,
the court agreed that it misstated the substantive law, which requires the
40 5
defendant either to warn or to make the premises safe, but not both.
In one case, the court concluded that this error was harmless because,
while the defendant disputed whether there was an obstruction in the
roadway at all, it conceded that, if there was, it did nothing to warn plaintiff or make the condition reasonably safe.40 6 In the other case, however,
the court held that the erroneous instruction amounted to a directed verdict because it allowed the jury to find liability based upon the undisputed failure to warn, without considering whether the defendant made
4 07
the condition reasonably safe.
In recent years, the supreme court has evinced a more lenient attitude
toward preservation of error with respect to the jury charge.40 8 In Munoz
v. Berne Group, Inc.,40 9 the San Antonio Court of Appeals noted that,
even under this more relaxed standard, the real question is whether the
complaining party made its objection known to the trial court in a timely
and clear manner and obtained a ruling.4 10 While the appellant's proposed instruction in Munoz may have been proper, the court found three
reasons for ruling that any error had been waived: the instruction was
submitted only as part of the appellant's complete charge; the appellant
failed to obtain a written notation that the submission had been refused;
4 11
and, she failed to object to its omission.
Rule 277412 directs trial judges not to comment on the weight of the
evidence in the jury charge, but provides that an appropriate instruction
or definition will not be objectionable merely because it can be construed
as an incidental comment on the evidence. 413 Maddox v. Denka Chemical Corp.4 14 teaches that the mere fact that a jury instruction correctly
states the law does not mean it is appropriate and cannot be considered
an impermissible comment. 415 The trial court in Maddox instructed the
jury that, as a "general rule," a property owner does not have a duty to
ensure that an independent contractor performs its work safely. 4 16 The
court of appeals concluded that this was error because the owner's duty
404. Williams, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 61 (emphasis added); Rodriguez, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
at 48.
405. Williams, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 61; Rodriguez, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 48.
406. Williams, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 62.
407. Rodriguez, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 48. The supreme court remanded, rather than
rendering judgment, because the district court had followed the erroneous pattern jury
charge. Id.
408. See, e.g., Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995) (discussed in
1996 Annual Survey, supra note 4 at 1397).
409. 919 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
410. Id. at 472.
411. Id. at 472-73.
412. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
413. Id.
414. 930 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Houston f[st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
415. Id. at 671-72.
416. Id. at 670.

19971

CIVIL PROCEDURE

1547

was an issue of law for the court to decide.4 17 According to the appellate
court, not only was this type of instruction unnecessary, but, in a suit by
an injured employee of the independent contractor, such an instruction
was tantamount to telling the jury that, "'[g]enerally, owners win cases
like this because they have no duty."'' 418 Moreover, reasoning that few
jurors would not be influenced by the trial judge's pronouncement of the
"'general rule,"' the court held that the error was reasonably calculated
4 19
to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper verdict.
XII. JUDGMENTS
Texas courts, including the supreme court, addressed several interesting points regarding judgments during the Survey period. In Walnut
Equipment Leasing Co. v. Wu, 4 20 a case involving the Uniform Enforcement of Judgments Act (UEJA), 4 21 the supreme court reversed the judgment of an intermediate appellate court and dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction because the defendants had not timely filed their motion for new trial. In this case, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against
the defendants in a Pennsylvania court and filed a petition in a Texas
state district court to domesticate that judgment.42 2 The defendants
failed to make an appropriate challenge to the Pennsylvania judgment;
and, after both parties had amended their pleadings, the trial court tried
the case as an action to enforce a judgment under the UEJA.423 The trial
court then entered a final judgment enforcing the Pennsylvania judgment,
4 24
following which the defendants unsuccessfully moved for a new trial.
The supreme court held that, when the plaintiff properly filed the foreign
judgment under the UEJA, that pleading comprised both an original petition and a final judgment on the date it was filed.42 5 Consequently, the
defendants' motion for a new trial, filed approximately three years and
three months after the plaintiff filed the foreign judgment in Texas under
the UEJA, was untimely.4 2 6 The amended pleadings and "second judgment" entered by the trial court were nullities and did not extend the
42 7
defendants' deadline to move for a new trial.
In Zamarripa v. Sifuentes,4 28 the plaintiffs took a default judgment
against the defendant the same day he filed his answer. Thereafter, the
417. Id. at 671.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 672.
420. 920 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1996).
421. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-35.008 (Vernon 1986).
422. Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 285.
423. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 1986).
424. Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 285.
425. Id. at 286; see also Bahr v. Kohr, 928 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996,
writ denied) (holding that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a properly-filed foreign
judgment if the foreign judgment has been on file more than thirty days).
426. Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286.
427. Id.
428. 929 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
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parties exchanged discovery on the merits and settlement offers until the
defendant learned of the default judgment and sought to have it reconsidered.42 9 As approximately eight months had passed since the judgment
had been entered, the trial court concluded that its plenary power had
4 30
expired and denied the motion to reconsider. The defendant appealed;
however, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
over an interlocutory appeal. 431 Specifically, the appellate court noted
that it could not determine from the face of the judgment when prejudgment interest would begin to accrue, and the judgment did not contain a
"Mother Hubbard clause. '432 The court seemed further persuaded that
the judgment was not final because the parties had conducted meritbased discovery. 433 Thus, without addressing the merits of a motion for
new trial, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had jurisdic434
tion to consider such a motion.
The court in Dezso v. Harwood435 held that where the plaintiff had
named the incorrect defendant in his petition but had actually and properly served the correct defendant, a trial court did not err in entering a
default judgment against the defendant who failed to timely appear. The
Dezso court distinguished its ruling from those cases 436 in which default
judgments were reversed when a plaintiff had correctly named the proper
defendant but served an incorrect person (i.e., not the named defendant). 437 Reasoning that the plaintiff had served the correct defendant,
who actually knew or should have known from the plain language of the
petition that the claims at issue actually related to her, the court concluded that it was incumbent upon the defendant, in those circumstances,
438
to appear in the lawsuit.
In Home Savings of America, FSB v. Harris County Water Control &
Improvement DistrictNo. 70,4 3 9 the court reversed a default judgment for
unpaid property taxes where the appellant responded by serving and filing a letter advising that the appellant had no interest in the land allegedly in tax default. The court ruled that, while the letter was defective as
an answer, it did constitute a sufficient appearance to preclude a default
judgment."40 Although the letter had not been signed by a named party
or an attorney, the court held that it constituted a response precluding the
429. Id. at 656.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 657.
433. Id. at 658.
434. Id.
435. 926 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
436. Callan v. Bartlett Elec. Coop., 423 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Thomas v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 405 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1966, no writ).
437. Dezso, 926 S.W.2d at 373-74.
438. Id. at 374.
439. 928 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
440. Id. at 218.
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entry of a default judgment. 441
Finally, in Woosley v. Smith, 442 an appeal from a summary judgment in
a proceeding for adoption and the termination of parental rights, the
court addressed whether an original decree was final or interlocutory
when followed by a second decree. In this case, a baby's biological
mother and father executed affidavits waiving their interests in the child
incident to an adoption proceeding."43 Based on those affidavits, the trial
court first entered a decree terminating the rights of the biological parents. 444 As the biological mother was married to someone other than the
biological father, the trial court entered a second decree terminating any
parental relationship between the baby and the biological mother's husband a week after entry of the first decree. The biological father then
filed suit to set aside the adoption order and the decree terminating his
parental rights. 4 5 The court of appeals held that the first decree, terminating the rights of the biological parents, was a final, non-interlocutory
order in that it disposed of all the issues of the case. 44 6 However, inasmuch as the court retained its plenary power under Rule 329b 44 7 to modify, the court could correct the error in the first decree regarding the
presumptive status of the child's parents. 448 Thus, the second decree did
not render the first void, but rather, the second decree incorporated the
first, leaving it intact. The court concluded that the decree terminating
the biological father's rights was valid as a matter of law. 4 9
XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Construing the interplay between subsections of Rule 329b 450 regarding motions for new trial and motions to modify a judgment, the supreme
court in L.M. Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs45 1 held in a per curiam opinion
that the denial of a party's timely-filed motion for new trial does not
shorten the time a trial court retains plenary power to resolve a timelyfiled motion to modify judgment. In Childs, the petitioner filed suit on a
sworn account against an estate.4 52 Concluding that the petitioner had
not properly proved its claim as required under the Texas Probate
Code, 453 the trial court entered judgment for the respondent and, on the
same date, denied the petitioner's first motion for new trial.4 5 4 The peti441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id. at 218-19.
925 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
ld. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
Woosley, 925 S.W.2d at 87.
Id.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
929 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1996).
Id. at 443.
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 301 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
Childs, 929 S.W.2d at 443.
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tioner then successfully moved the trial court to modify its judgment to
reflect a dismissal of its claim without prejudice.4 5 5 In affirming the trial
court's ruling in part, the court reasoned that, although a party must file
its motion for new trial within thirty days after the trial court signs the
judgment, Rule 329b 456 does not reduce the seventy-five day period in
which a trial court retains plenary power to adjudicate a motion to modify a judgment.45 7 However, "[a] trial court's plenary jurisdiction cannot
extend beyond 105 days after the trial court signs the judgment. '4 58
Construing the interplay between Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5459
and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), the supreme court, in Stokes
v. Aberdeen Insurance Co.,460 held that a party properly preserved its appellate rights when it timely sent the district judge a copy of its motion for
new trial, even though the party did not timely file a copy of its motion
with the district clerk. In Stokes, the district court entered a summary
judgment on June 16, 1994.461 The district clerk's postcard, however, erroneously listed June 19, 1994, as the date of the judgment's entry.462 On
July 18, 1994, the appellant sent two copies of its motion for new trial, one
to the district clerk by Federal Express, and the other to the district court
judge at her proper address by regular mail.4 63 The supreme court held
that the appellant's act of mailing a copy of its motion to the district judge
at her proper address was "conditionally effective" as if it were mailed to
the clerk's proper address because the clerk serves as a ministerial servant of the court and is neither separate from nor above the court itself.464 Although noting that the cautious practitioner should ensure that
the clerk actually receives its copy of the pleading at issue, the court rejected as too restrictive the argument that the clerk must receive the
"same" piece of paper that the party actually mailed.4 65
Two other appellate courts also addressed the scope of a trial court's
power to grant motions for new trial during the Survey period. In Townes
v. Wood 4 66 the court held that a party must obtain a written order granting its motion for new trial within the time provided under Rule
329b(e) 467 for the order to be effective. In this case, the defendant moved
for a new trial, which the trial court orally granted at the hearing; after
455. Id. The trial court also modified its judgment to note that a properly authenticated
claim had been filed and served, and that the date to answer the claim expired on June 13,
1994.
456. TEX. R. Cv. P. 329b.
457. Childs, 929 S.W.2d at 444.
458. Id.
459. TEX. R. Cv. P. 5.
460. 917 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1996).
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 268.
465. Id. ("We construe the words 'the same' in the rules to mean an original or any
copy of the motion sufficient for filing.").
466. 934 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding).
467. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
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noting the decision on its docket sheet, the court issued an order setting
the case for trial. 468 The court, however, never reduced its order granting
the motion for new trial to writing. After the plaintiff sought to enforce
the original judgment entered in its favor, the defendant filed a petition
for writ of mandamus. 469 The court denied the writ, holding that neither
470
the oral ruling nor the docket entry complied with Rule 329b(e).
Moreover, the subsequent order setting a new trial date, which did not
mention the motion for new trial, was insufficient to constitute a "written
471
order" as required by Rule 329b(c).
In Kvanvig v. Garcia,472 however, the court reached a more equitable
result where the plaintiff timely moved for, and the trial court granted, a
new trial before the plaintiff had paid the statutorily required 473 fifteen
dollar filing fee. Although the defendant did not lodge an objection regarding the plaintiff's nonpayment of the filing fee in the district court, it
subsequently filed a mandamus proceeding challenging the district court's
jurisdiction to order a new trial because of the unpaid fee.474 In connection with its response to the petition, the plaintiff finally tendered the
filing fee. 475 The court denied the writ of mandamus, holding that,
although the trial court was under no obligation to rule upon a motion for
new trial until the movant tendered the filing fee, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in granting such a motion so long as it did so while it
476
retained its plenary power over the case.
In In re Simpson,477 the court dismissed an appeal where the appellant
had filed his motion for new trial and appeal bond more than thirty days
after the trial court entered judgment against him. The appellate court
held that the appeal was not timely and granted the appellant ten days to
show grounds to continue the appeal.4 78 In response, the appellant
moved the trial court to extend the effective date of the judgment under
Rule 306a,4 79 arguing that he had not received actual notice of the judgment until after the deadline to move for a new trial had expired. 480 In
support of this motion to extend, the appellant's current counsel signed a
verification page attesting to the truth of the motion as "to the best of
[his] knowledge." '481 The appellant also attached two other affidavits
from his past and present attorneys; these affidavits had been signed
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

Townes, 934 S.W.2d at 806.
Id.
Id.; TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
Townes, 934 S.W.2d at 806; TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
928 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding).
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.317(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
Kvanvig, 928 S.W.2d at 778.
Id.
Id. at 779.
932 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ).
Id. at 675.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
Simpson, 932 S.W.2d at 675.
Id. at 677.
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before a notary, but were unverified. 482 The appellant did not file an
affidavit stating that he personally was unaware of the date on which the
judgment had been entered against him. 483 Finding that the appellant
had not presented evidence sufficient to invoke the exception to Rule
329484 provided for in Rules 5485 and 306a,4 86 the court dismissed the appeal holding that the averment by the attorney that included the caveat of
"to the best of my knowledge" was defective under Rule 306a(5). 487 The
court further ruled that the unverified affidavits could not be considered
as competent evidence. 488 The court also expressed dissatisfaction with
the absence of any evidence from the appellant himself attesting to his
lack of personal knowledge of the date of the entry of the judgment.
Moreover, although Rule 306a 489 does not expressly set a time for filing a
motion under that rule, the court relied upon the holding of at least one
other court 49° that a motion under Rule 306a 491 must be filed within
thirty days after the party or his attorney received notice of the signing of
the judgment. 4 92 Since the appellant waited until 99 days after learning
of the entry of judgment against him, the court rejected his motion for
this reason as well.493
XIV. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
The court in General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple4 94 addressed the interplay between motions for protective orders under Rule 166b(5) 495 and the requirements for sealing of "court records" under Rule 76a. 49 6 The court
held that a trial judge presented with a request for protection of unfiled
discovery materials under the former rule should "proceed without regard to rule 76a until the non-movant alleges and establishes that the
documents are 'court records.' ' 497 Acknowledging that there is some disagreement among the intermediate courts of appeals on the proper standard of review of a trial court's determination of this issue, the court in
Kepple applied an abuse of discretion standard in upholding the trial
court's decision that the discovery in question constituted "court
482. Id.
483. lId at 678.
484. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329.
485. TEX. R. APP. P. 5.

486. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
487. Simpson, 932 S.W.2d at 677; TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(5).
488. Id. at 678.
489. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
490. Womack-Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso, 886 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied); contra Vineyard Bay Dev. Co., Inc. v. Vineyard on Lake
Travis, 864 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
491. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
492. Simpson, 932 S.W.2d at 678.
493. Id.
494. 917 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ granted).
495. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(5).
496. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.
497. Kepple, 917 S.W.2d at 448.
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records." 498
XV.

DISQUALIFICATION AND RECUSAL OF JUDGES

Section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code permits a litigant to disqualify an assigned or visiting judge if he objects before the first hearing
or trial over which the assigned judge is to preside.499 In Texas Employment Commission v. Alvarez, 50 0 a defendant timely filed his "Objection
to Visiting Judge" before the case was called to trial, but the objection
failed to identify the challenged judge by name. Because the case was not
reached for trial that day, the objection was never presented to the assigned judge nor served on opposing counsel. Three months later, when
the case was called for trial a second time, it was again assigned to the
same visiting judge. On this occasion, however, the defendant did not
oppose the visiting judge's assignment, so it neither reurged its original
objection nor filed a new one. On appeal from an adverse judgment rendered after trial, the plaintiff attempted to rely on the objection originally
filed by the defendant, claiming that the visiting judge's disqualification
was mandatory and automatic once the objection was filed.
The court of appeals disagreed for two reasons. First, it held that the
defendant's failure to specifically name the judge was an omission that
rendered the objection ineffective.50 1 The court distinguished the situation presented in Amateur Athletic Foundation v. Hoffman,50 2 in which
the Dallas Court of Appeals recently held that a "blanket" objection to a
visiting judge was sufficient.50 3 There the litigant actually presented his
"blanket" objection to the assigned judge, unlike the case in Alvarez, so
there could not have been any question as to whom the objection was
targeted. 5°4 Second, the court in Alvarez decided that the defendant's
objection would not have automatically disqualified the visiting judge,
even if he had been named in the objection, because it was never
presented to the court for ruling.505 An objection under section 74.053
does not present constitutional grounds for disqualification; 50 6 therefore,
498. Id. at 448, 451 (citations omitted). The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the trial court erred in conducting a public hearing under TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a
before it determined that the documents in question were, in fact, court records. Id. at 452.
The court acknowledged that holding separate hearings is the better practice, so that the
allegedly confidential documents are not discussed in a public hearing (which would potentially compromise their confidential nature) before the trial judge decides whether the documents are court records. The court concluded, however, that any error was harmless
because the judge ultimately did find that the documents were court records and the details
contained therein were not discussed at the hearing. Id.
499. TEX. Gov'r CODE AN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
500. 915 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
501. Id. at 164.
502. 893 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) (discussed in 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 1404-05).
503. Hoffman, 893 S.W.2d at 603.
504. Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d at 164.
505. Id. at 166.
506. TEx. CONsT. art. V, § 11 requires disqualification when the judge has an interest in
the case, has been counsel in the case, or is connected with either of the parties, by affinity

1554

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

the court concluded, a party can waive its objection to an assigned judge
by proceeding to trial without first presenting the objection and obtaining
507
a ruling from the assigned judge.
A subsequent decision of the Texas Supreme Court arguably calls into
question both of the Alvarez holdings. In Flores v. Banner,50 8 the court
held that an assigned judge's disqualification was mandatory when one of
the parties timely filed an objection to the assignment of "any former
judge," without specifically identifying the assigned judge. Although this
holding seems at odds with Alvarez, the supreme court did not disapprove of Alvarez, but instead simply distinguished the facts of the case.
With respect to the identification issue, the court pointed out that Flores
learned a visiting judge would hear her motion only an hour before the
hearing, and she did not know who the assigned judge would be until he
took the bench.5 0 9 Moreover, like the litigant in Amateur Athletic, Flores
actually presented her objection to the assigned judge for determination,
so he knew he was the subject of her objection. 5 10 In light of these facts,
the decisions in Flores and Alvarez are easily reconcilable. Although the
Flores court held that disqualification is "mandatory" once an objection is
timely filed, that may not mean that the disqualification is "automatic" or
self-operative absent a presentation of the objection.
Numerous decisions have held that an objection under section 74.053 is
too late if it comes after the assigned judge makes any ruling in the case,
even on a motion for continuance. 511 After reviewing these cases, the
court in Perkins v. Groff51 2 concluded that none had decided whether an
objection was timely if it was filed after the assigned judge had already
made rulings in the case without actually conducting a "hearing" in open
court at which counsel presented oral argument. 51 3 Although section 74.053 permits the filing of an objection before "the first hearing or
trial, '5 14 the court held that the objection must precede any rulings in the
case by the assigned judge, even those not made in open court. 51 5 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the supreme court's
decision in Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. NASA 1 Business Center5 16
that the term "hearing" does not necessarily contemplate either a peror consanguinity, within the degree prescribed by law. These three mandatory grounds for
disqualification are jurisdictional, cannot be waived, and may be raised for the first time
after judgment. Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18, 202 S.W.2d 218, 221-22 (1947).
507. Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d at 166.
508. 932 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
509. Id. at 501.
510. Id.
511. See, e.g., Morris v. Short, 902 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, writ denied) (discussed in 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 1386, 1404); Money v.
Jones, 766 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied) (discussed in Ernest E.
Figari et al., Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 541, 551-52
(1990)).
512. 936 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied).
513. Id. at 665-66.
514. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
515. Perkins, 936 S.W.2d at 664.
516. 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988).
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sonal appearance before the court or an oral presentation. 517
Republic Royalty Co. v. Evins518 involved an unseemly "tug of war"
over jurisdiction of cases that had been consolidated and ordered transferred back and forth between two courts in the same county. Republic
filed the first lawsuit in Hidalgo County against Shell. The second suit,
filed against Fina four months later by a different plaintiff, was randomly
assigned to a different court in Hidalgo County. Republic filed a motion
to recuse the judge in the first suit and, together with the plaintiff in the
second suit, filed a joint motion to transfer requesting that the judge in
the second suit consolidate both actions in his court. Before the motion
to recuse in the first suit was decided, the judge in the second suit granted
the plaintiffs' motion and ordered the first suit transferred to his court for
consolidation with the second. When the judge in the first suit nevertheless proceeded with a hearing on the motion to recuse, Republic attempted to withdraw the motion as moot due to the intervening transfer.
The first court therefore signed an order granting withdrawal of the motion to recuse "with prejudice to its refiling," whereupon the defendants
in the two suits immediately filed a motion asking the judge in the first
suit to transfer the consolidated suits back to her court. This latter motion was granted without hearing, and the first judge signed an order
transferring the cases back to her court. On the same day, however, the
judge in the second suit entered an order requested by the plaintiffs enjoining the transfer.
The Texas Constitution, the Texas Government Code, and the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure authorize district courts within the same county
to transfer cases and exchange benches. 519 The court of appeals in Republic observed that all of these provisions were intended as a convenience for the courts and parties, with an underlying assumption that the
courts, if not the parties, would communicate and cooperate with one
another.5 20 Absent such collegiality, however, there is no mechanism to
prevent transfers between courts involved in a dispute over jurisdiction
aside from the intervention of either the local administrative judge or the
appellate court by mandamus. 521 Accordingly, the court conditionally
granted a writ of mandamus returning to the first court the suit originally
filed there. 522 Although the first suit could have been transferred to another court within the same county for some legitimate reason involving
judicial convenience or equalization of dockets, the appellate court held
that principles of dominant jurisdiction 523 dictate that the first case not be
517. Perkins, 936 S.W.2d at 666.
518. 931 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding).
519. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 24,303, 74.093 (Vernon
1988 & Supp. 1997); TEX. R. Civ. P. 330(e).
520. Republic, 931 S.W.2d at 342.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 344.
523. "The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed
acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts." Id. at 342 (citing Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974)).
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transferred arbitrarily once it was randomly assigned to a particular
court.524 The court also concluded that the mere filing of the motion to
recuse the first judge provided no rational basis for the case's transfer to
the second court; any other holding would mean the first judge could be
effectively recused without requiring the moving party to prove his
grounds for recusal.5 25 The court further disagreed with the plaintiffs'
contention that the first judge was precluded from ordering the cases
transferred back to her court due to the motion to recuse. 526 Rule 18a(a)
provides only for recusal of "the judge before whom the case is pending," 527 so the issue of recusal would not ripen until the case was returned
to the first court.528 Although the first judge was justified in transferring
the consolidated case back to her court in order to correct the initial
abuse of discretion by the second judge, the appellate court believed she
should retain only the lawsuit initially filed in her court and must sever
and return the other lawsuit to the second court.52 9 The court opined that
trial judges are discouraged, and perhaps even prohibited, from unilaterally transferring a case where the judge from whose court the case is to be
transferred objects, even if a rational basis for the transfer might otherwise exist.530 Despite the machinations of the parties, therefore, the lawsuits ultimately remained in the courts in which they were originally filed.
Blanchard v. Krueger53 1 concerned a peculiar set of circumstances of a
different sort. In response to a father's motion to modify in a child custody dispute, the mother filed a motion to recuse alleging that the trial
judge had ex parte communications about the father's motion with the
father's attorney and the court appointed ad litem. The trial judge forwarded the motion to recuse to the presiding judge of the administrative
judicial district, as required under Rule 18a, 532 where it was assigned to
another judge for hearing. Immediately before that hearing, the judge
facing recusal filed a general denial in the underlying suit and asked the
assigned judge to award him attorney's fees and court costs against the
mother. The mother then requested leave to amend her motion to include as additional grounds for recusal that the trial judge now had an
interest in the lawsuit. The assigned judge denied the requested trial
amendment and the motion to recuse. After the case was returned to the
trial judge, the mother filed a second motion to recuse, reasserting the
grounds she had included in her earlier motion to amend the pleadings.
This second motion was likewise denied.
524. Id. The court observed that arbitrary transfers within a county would undermine
the random assignment system and encourage improper forum or judge shopping by the
parties. Id.
525. Id. at 343.

526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.

Id.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a).
Republic, 931 S.W.2d at 343.
Id.
Id.
916 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(d).
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The court of appeals held that the trial judge's disqualification was
mandatory under the Texas Constitution 533 "when he took the extraordinary step of filing a general denial and became a party to the underlying
suit. ' 534 The trial judge argued that mandamus was unavailable because
Rule 18a 535 provides that denial of a motion to recuse may only be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. The court of appeals disagreed,
however, observing that a disqualification on constitutional grounds ren536
ders any order involving judicial discretion void.
XVI.

MISCELLANEOUS

A. SANCrIONS
In Bisby v. Dow Chemical Co., 537 the court reversed and remanded a
judgment in which the trial court had imposed sanctions against the appellant that included an unconditional award of appellee's attorneys' fees
on appeal. The appellant in this action had originally sued Dow Chemical
in another suit in Harris County, Texas, relative to her breast implants. 538
In response to adverse discovery rulings entered against her in the breast
implant case, the appellant had filed an $18 million dollar lien in Brazoria
County on all property of the district court judge, Dow Chemical, and
Dow Chemical's executives and attorneys. Dow filed this second action
to remove the lien and enjoin the appellant from refiling it. The appellant responded by refiling the lien against the district court judge in the
second action, the Brazoria County district clerk and her husband, a deputy district clerk and her husband, and Dow's attorneys in the second
case. Following a trial at which the appellant did not appear, the trial
court invalidated the liens and enjoined the appellant from filing any further liens.5 39 The trial court also awarded Dow, as a sanction against the
appellant under Rule 13, $25,000 in unconditional attorneys' fees on appeal. 540 The appellate court reversed the sanction against the appellant
and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred in awarding
sanctions against the appellant without first providing her notice of its
intent to award sanctions and in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the appellant's pleadings were in bad faith or made
with the intent to harass. 54 1
533. TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 11 provides: "No judge shall sit in any case wherein he may
be interested ...."
534. Blanchard, 916 S.W.2d at 18.

535. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(f).
536. Blanchard, 916 S.W.2d at 19 (citing Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632
S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982)). The court also noted several federal decisions which suggested that the judge should not have participated in the mandamus action that challenged
his refusal to recuse himself. Id. at 19 n.9; see, e.g., Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 810
(3rd Cir. 1965); United States v. Craig, 875 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
537. 931 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
538. Id at 19.
539. Id. at 20.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 21.
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The plaintiffs in Rich v. Elliot542 originally filed suit in 1985. The defendants answered and moved to transfer venue. Before the trial court
could rule on the venue motion, however, the plaintiffs each filed for
bankruptcy, but failed to notify the district court of the termination of
their bankruptcies as required under the district court's local rules. 543
When they finally emerged from bankruptcy, the plaintiffs obtained new
counsel who, in 1995, filed a certificate of readiness for trial.5 44 Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant's motion to transfer
venue, which plaintiff's new counsel did not attend. 545 Accordingly, the
trial court dismissed the entire action as a sanction for, among other
things, the lengthy delay in prosecuting the action and subsequently refused to reinstate it after a full evidentiary hearing. 546 Notwithstanding
numerous incidents of extreme delay and lack of diligence by the plaintiffs, the court of appeals reversed the dismissal sanction because the trial
court had not made any evidentiary determinations as to whether the delays were caused by the plaintiffs, their attorneys, or both. 547 The
supreme court, however, interpreted the trial court's order as a dismissal
for want of prosecution rather than as a sanction for discovery abuse and
reversed the court of appeals holding that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in finding that the delays unreasonably prejudiced
the defense and that the plaintiffs failed to show good cause for reinstate548
ment of the suit.
B.

BIFURCATION

In Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Cooper,549 the court denied a petition for writ of mandamus and held that while bifurcation of a contract
claim and a bad faith claim is desirable where evidence of settlement offers is relevant to the latter claim, there is no requirement that the contract claim proceed first. Rather, after reviewing several factors, the
court concluded that it is the insurer's burden to prove that it will be
prejudiced by the conflicts inherent in the continuation of all claims absent an abatement, and that the insurer must adduce evidence on the specifics of those conflicts. 550 In this case, the insurer sought not only to
bifurcate the contractual and extra-contractual claims for trial, but for all
of the pretrial proceedings as well. 55 1 Since the insurer had not presented
any evidence supporting this request, the court denied its writ of mandamus, holding that "although a trial court must try contractual claims sepa542. 932 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996), rev'd sub nom. MacGregor v. Rich, 40
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 298 (Jan. 31, 1997).
543. Id. at 86; 168TH (TEX.) DIST. CT. Loc. R. 3.10 (El Paso County).
544. Rich, 932 S.W.2d at 85.
545. Id.

546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 87-88.
McGregor, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 298.
916 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 701.
Id. at 700.
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rately from extracontractual claims where settlement negotiations are
prohibited in the first and critical to the second, that does not mean we
will intrude upon the trial court's discretion
in deciding at what pretrial
'552
stage such separation must occur.
C.

MAILBOX RULE

Ruling that the delivery of a petition by Federal Express on the last
date to file suit did not constitute a filing by the U.S. Mail under Rule
554
5,553

the court in Fountain Parkway, Ltd. v. TarrantAppraisal District

affirmed the dismissal of a petition challenging a tax appraisal as untimely. In so holding, the court rejected an argument that the language
in the Texas Tax Code,555 that a suit to compel a review of an appraisal
court's ruling "may" be filed on the forty-fifth day after the board's ruling, was permissive rather than mandatory. 556 The court then held that
the appellant could not invoke Rule 5557 and argue that the delivery of its
petition by Federal Express on the 45th day constituted a filing under the
mailbox rule. 55 8 The court rejected the argument that a Federal Express

drop box is a branch of the district court clerk's office for purposes of the

559
mailbox rule.

D.

VISITING JUDGES

In Taiwan Shrimp Farm Village Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Development, Inc.,560 the court rejected an argument that a county court

judge, sitting in a district court, could not hear a case where the amount
in controversy exceeded $100,000. The court ruled that the terms
"judge," "statutory county court," and "county court at law" as used
under the Texas Government Code 561 were not synonymous, and that the
statutory language setting the jurisdictional limits of a court applied only
to the court and not the judge. 562 Thus, a county court judge could properly preside over a district court case by assignment. 563
E.

ATTORNEYS' FEES

In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mayfield, 564 the supreme court granted a
552. Id. at 703.

553. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
554. 920 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
555. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(g) (Vernon 1992) ("[w]ithin 45 days after receiving
notice of the appraisal review board's determination of a motion under this section, the
property owner or the chief appraiser may file suit to compel the board to order a change
in the appraisal roll as required by this section.").
556. Fountain Parkway, 920 S.W.2d at 801.
557. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
558. Fountain Parkway, 920 S.W.2d at 803.
559. Id. at 802-03.
560. 915 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
561. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 25.0004, .0006, .0332(a) (Vernon 1988).
562. Taiwan Shrimp, 915 S.W.2d at 66-67.
563. Id. at 67.
564. 923 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
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writ of mandamus and held that the trial court erred when, after appointing an attorney to represent the plaintiff, it also ordered the defendant to pay the fees for the plaintiff's attorney. Noting that although the
Texas Government Code 56 5 authorizes district courts to appoint counsel
to represent indigent parties, that statute does not authorize
shifting the
566
fees for such appointed counsel to the opposing party.

F. ADR

AND RULE 11 AGREEMENTS

During the Survey period, appellate courts further explored a trial
court's power to enforce judgments resulting from mediated settlements
where one party seeks to renege on its agreement. For example, in Cadle
Co. v. Castle,5 67 the court, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded a judgment entered by the trial court enforcing a written settlement agreement
reached in a mediation. In this borrower-lender dispute, the parties
reached a settlement agreement during a court-ordered mediation that
was "subject to" final approval of the senior management of one of the
prior lenders.568 Pending that approval, some of the parties filed motions
regarding the enforceability of the settlement agreement. 569 The trial
court held a non-evidentiary hearing and concluded that the terms of the
written settlement agreement should be incorporated into a final judgment. 570 The appellate court reversed, noting that the parties had not
filed the settlement under Rule 11571 and holding that, contrary to a suggestion by the dissent, section 154.071(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code 572 does not authorize a "summary" proceeding to enforce written settlement agreements. 573 Therefore, while a trial judge
should have discretion to tailor a judgment that accomplishes the goals of
a mediated settlement, that discretion did not translate into a summary,
non-evidentiary proceeding that would "effectively deprive[] a party of
the right to be confronted by appropriate pleadings, assert defenses, con' 574
duct discovery, and submit contested fact issues to a judge or jury.
Declining to treat the parties' pleadings regarding the enforceability of
the settlement agreement as either evidence or judicial admissions, the
court concluded that, because the trial court did not hear any evidence
there was no record sufficient to support its judgment. 575 Therefore, the
court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
565. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.016 (Vernon 1988).
566. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d at 593.
567. 913 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
568. Id. at 630.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11 ("Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open
court and entered of record.").
572. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
573. Cadle, 913 S.W.2d at 631.
574. Id. at 632.
575. Id. at 632-34.
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with its opinion. 576
Similarly, in Clopton v. Mountain Peak Water Supply Corp.,577 the
court reversed the trial court's summary dismissal of a suit after one party
announced its intent to renege on a hand-written settlement reached during a court-ordered mediation. In this case, the defendant's attorney informed the trial court that the plaintiff had decided to renege on the
mediated settlement. Without conducting for a hearing, the trial court
entered an order of dismissal and subsequently declined to set aside the
order. 578 The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred
in dismissing the plaintiffs claims absent notice or a hearing. 579 As in
Cadle,580 the court in Clopton went on to hold that "[t]he same procedures used to enforce other contracts should apply to mediated settlement agreements. '581 Thus, without deciding the enforceability issue, the
court remanded the action, noting that the party seeking to enforce a
settlement agreement must provide proper pleading and proof to support
582
enforcement of the agreement under contract law.
In Clanin v. Clanin,583 on the other hand, the court affirmed a portion
of a final divorce decree entered pursuant to a valid agreement under
Rule 11, 5 M in which the parties announced on the record at a hearing that
they had entered into a settlement agreement and then dictated its terms
'585
into the record "by direct and cross-examination of the parties.
Similarly, the court in Kosowska v. Khan586 held that a valid Rule 11587
agreement barred a second suit on that same subject. In this case, the
plaintiff sued over defective repairs to her car's engine. 588 The parties
agreed to settle that suit for $10,000 and memorialized their agreement in
a statement which was recorded in the defendant's attorney's office
before a certified court reporter and filed with the trial court. 589 The
plaintiff then orally repudiated the agreement. 590 Eventually, the trial
576. Id. at 635; see also In re McIntosh, 918 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996,
no writ) (holding that a trial court does not err in refusing to enforce a settlement regarding a divorce reached during mediation where the parties' "agreement" included language
that they were "to take the agreement to their respective attorneys to review and to meet
within ten days ... to finalize the agreement.").
577. 911 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
578. Id. at 526.
579. Id. at 527.
580. Cadle, 913 S.W.2d at 627.
581. Clopton, 911 S.W.2d at 527.
582. Id.
583. 918 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
584. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
585. Clanin, 918 S.W.2d at 675. But see Davis v. Wickham, 917 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (holding that the trial court erred in entering an
agreed order on a parent's motion to enforce judgment based on a mediated settlement
concerning child custody where the other parent repudiated the agreement).
586. 929 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ requested).
587. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
588. Kosowska, 929 S.W.2d at 506.
589. Id.
590. Id.
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court dismissed the case with prejudice; 59 1 the appellate court, however,
reformed the order to "without prejudice." The plaintiff then filed a second suit on the identical subject matter.5 92 The trial court entered summary judgment against the plaintiff based upon the settlement
agreement. 593 The appellate court affirmed, finding that the settlement
agreement "[was] in substantial compliance with Rule 11 as a matter
of
594
law" because it was a signed writing that was filed with the court.
G.

ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

In Golden Rule Insurance Co. v. Harper,595 the supreme court reversed
an injunction that precluded an insurer from pursuing a parallel action in
a different state against its insured, holding that a single parallel proceeding does not justify an anti-suit injunction. The insurer in this case had
denied coverage to its insured for medical treatment it deemed to be experimental and, therefore, excluded under its policy. 596 The insured subsequently died, and her husband brought suit in Harris County under the
policy. 597 The insurer originally moved to transfer venue, but then withdrew its motion and instituted a declaratory judgment action in Illinois
where the insured's husband lived and the policy had been issued.598 The
district court enjoined the insurer from pursuing its competing action and
the court of appeals affirmed. 599 The supreme court reversed and dissolved the injunction holding that the Illinois action did not constitute
"special circumstances" and hence did not fall within any of the four situations in which an anti-suit injunction was proper: "(1) to address a threat
to the court's jurisdiction; (2) to prevent the evasion of important public
policy; (3) to prevent a multiplicity of suits; or (4) to protect a party from
vexatious or harassing litigation. '600 In reaching its holding, the court
disapproved of the language in Admiral Insurance Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway601 that discussed the potential problems associated with parallel legal proceedings. 602 Thus, the court held that neither
parallel nor mirror image proceedings warrant the entry of an anti-suit
603
injunction.

591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 507.
594. Id. at 508.
595. 925 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1996).
596. Id. at 650.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id.at 651 (citing Christensen v. Integrity Ins. Co., 719 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. 1986) and
Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1986)).
601. 848 S.W.2d 251, 255-56 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
602. Harper,925 S.W.2d at 651.
603. Id. at 651-52.

